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Smoking kills. Of this, we can be sure. If the question were simply whether
restricting cigarette advertising to protect the health of citizens is within the "police
power" of local governments, the answer would be easy, at least as far as limitations
imposed by federal law is concerned.' States and cities would have broad discretion to
regulate cigarette advertising as they saw fit. However, the question is not so simple.
There are two principal hurdles local government must overcome in order to regulate
the marketing of cigarettes - the First Amendment and preemption. The purpose of
this article is to discuss the impact of these two barriers to regulation - what they
prohibit and what they allow.
Determining the power of state and local governments to regulate cigarette ad-
vertising is important because the politics of tobacco are often dramatically different at
the level of Congress and local government. The public in some states - and even
more, the public in some cities - is quite willing to regulate the tobacco industry's
advertising and marketing practices. If states and localities have the power to regulate,
there will be substantial restrictions on the advertising and marketing of cigarettes, par-
ticularly to children. On the other hand, if federal policies exclusively regulate the
marketing of cigarettes, history has shown that the tobacco industry will have much
more leeway in selling their products.
On August 28, 1996, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) published a final
rule, which substantially restricts certain types of cigarette advertising that might have
a particular effect on children.2 For example, the final rule prohibits cigarette vending
machines, free samples, mail order sales, and self-service displays. It also regulates the
content of advertising to which children and adolescents are exposed and bans the
distribution of promotional items such as hats and tee shirts. The basis of the FDA's
* Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. Research for this paper grew out of
a project by the Tobacco Control Research Center at Northeastern supported by a grant from the Na-
tional Cancer Institute. The paper was originally prepared for a conference of State Attorneys General
held in 1995, which was supported by a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. The author
wishes to thank Alexa Morrison, Ann Laquerre and Michael Belancio for helpful research assistance.
1. Municipalities may also be restricted by state law embodied in state statutes or constitutions.
In fact, there are signs that the tobacco industry has adopted a strategy of lobbying state legislatures
to prevent cities from regulating the sale and marketing of cigarettes. See Russ Freyman, Butting In,
REG., Nov. 1995, at 55. These state law limitations are outside the scope of'this article.
2. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to
Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (August 28, 1996).
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jurisdiction is the determination that nicotine is a drug and, therefore, the FDA has the
authority to regulate the sale and marketing of cigarettes under the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act.3 However, states and localities may wish to regulate local advertis-
ing in areas not covered by the FDA Rule or in ways that are different from the Rule's
requirements. Moreover, the rule has been challenged by various industry groups and
awaits judicial review.4 Thus, it remains important to determine the extent of state and
local authority over cigarette advertising.
As of today, there have been few cases testing the limitations of federal law on
state and local authority, and the law remains in a state of flux. The cases decided thus
far suggest a rather odd array of local powers. States and cities may bar the sale of
cigarettes entirely, but they cannot bar its advertising. They can restrict advertising in
order to protect their citizens' aesthetic sensibilities, but they cannot restrict advertising
in order to protect their citizens' health. They can protect children from advertising that
has a tendency to encourage them to purchase cigarettes illegally, but they cannot pro-
tect adults from inadequate warnings. They can probably regulate the location and
types of cigarette advertising displays, commercial appeals that are blatantly aimed at
minors, and other advertising particularly likely to affect minors. In short, it appears
that states and cities can exercise some authority over cigarette marketing and advertis-
ing, though there are substantial limits to their power. These limitations stem from the
relatively unique way the law of preemption has developed in this area as well as how
the Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment to restrictions on commercial
speech.
The article proceeds in the following way. Parts II and III provide a general
overview of the current framework for preemption and First Amendment analysis.
Parts IV and V apply this framework to restrictions on advertising that promotes the
illegal purchase of cigarettes by minors.
II. PREEMPTION - AN OVERVIEW
The extent of federal preemption of state regulation of cigarette advertising stems
from the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act5 [hereinafter the 1969 Act]
3. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1994). The FDA has published a lengthy analysis of the factual basis
for the original proposed rule as well as the basis for its jurisdiction. U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion, Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products Is a Drug and These Products Are Nico-
tine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (1995); reprinted in 60 Fed.
Reg. 41,453 (1995). The FDA Rule preempts state and local regulations of cigarette advertising to the
extent that they are different from, or in addition to, the requirements of the Rule. See 61 Fed. Reg.
44,548. However, the Rule also provides for a waiver provision whereby a local regulation could re-
main in effect. Id. at 44,549. In the event that a state or city chooses to seek. such a waiver, the
other limitations of federal law discussed in this article will still need to be considered.
4. Industry Sues in Attempt to Block FDA Regulation of Tobacco, Mealey's Litigation Reports:
Tobacco, Aug. 17, 1995.
5. The original Act was passed in 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965). The 1969
amendments were known as the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84
Stat. 87 (1969). The Act is now codified, as amended, at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1994). Section 1334,
the preemption section, provides:
(a) Additional Statement
No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section
1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) State Regulations
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State
law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which
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as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.6 The
Cipollone decision was based on a personal injury action brought on behalf of a wom-
an who died from lung cancer. Because some of her theories of recovery were based
on claims in cigarette advertising, the defendant argued that they were preempted. A
plurality of the Court decided that certain of her claims were preempted and others
were not. Most significantly, the plurality found that the preemptive effect of the 1969
Act is limited to the express terms of its language.'
Specifically, the "central inquiry" in deciding whether a state law is preempted is
"whether [a] legal duty... constitutes a 'requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health... imposed under State law with respect to advertising or promotion....
-8 The Court emphasized that not all state law claims involving advertising, including
personal injury claims, were preempted. Rather, each type of claim must be analyzed
to determine whether it fits within the express terms of the preemption provision. A
claim that can be said to be based on a "general duty," one that extends beyond the
protection of health, is not preempted.'
Thus, under Cipollone, the question of whether an advertising restriction is pre-
empted turns on the goal of the law. If it is based on protecting health, it is preempted.
If it can fairly be said to be based on some other policy goal, it is not preempted. This
approach to preemption, while not completely unique, is unlike most conventional
preemption analysis. Today, the most promising non-health basis for states and locali-
ties to restrict advertising is advancing the goal of preventing children from purchasing
illegal products. Parts IV applies the Cipollone framework to this important state goal,
but first it is useful to set out an overview of how preemption works under Cipollone.
The case law since Cipollone suggests four basic guides in determining whether
a restriction on cigarette advertising or marketing will survive a preemption challenge.
The underlying issue is whether the restriction can fairly be said to be based on a goal
other than protecting health. In making that determination, however, the analysis only
begins with the state's identification of a plausible non-health basis for the restriction.
The court is likely to decide whether a restriction is preempted based on an overall ex-
amination of four questions: 1) has the state identified a non-health goal that serves as
the basis of the restriction? 2) is there a legitimate connection between the restriction
and the non-health goal? 3) is the restriction reasonably tailored to accomplish the non-
health goal? and 4) is the restriction likely to lead to costly, inconsistent state regula-
tions? The case law since Cipollone indicates that this four-pronged analysis can be
applied to determine the likely prospects of a wide array of restrictions surviving a
preemption attack. The following discussion addresses each of these questions.
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.
6. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
7. Id. at 517. Justices Scalia and Thomas would have applied the preemption section even more
broadly. Id. at 544-46 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
8. Id. at 524.
9. See id. at 524-31. In particular, claims based on an alleged failure to warn are preempted.
Claims based on an obligation to avoid manufacturing defects, claims that rely solely on testing or
research practices, claims that involve actions unrelated to advertising or promotion, claims based on
breach of express warranties, claims based on fraudulent misrepresentations, and claims based on con-
spiracies to misrepresent or conceal material facts are not preempted. Id.
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A. Has the State Identified a Non-health Goal that Serves as the Basis of
the Restriction?
In order to avoid preemption, a state or local restriction must be based on some
policy goal of the state that can be analytically distinguished from the goal of protect-
ing the public's health. The policy may be a specific one set out in a statute or ordi-
nance, or it may be an application of a broader policy goal set out in a statute or rec-
ognized by the state's common law. For example, the plaintiffs in Mangini v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co.1" and Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore" were
successful in characterizing restrictions as based on the goal of preventing the promo-
tion of illegal products to minors.12
A preemption analysis that turns on the goal of a state law inherently raises
conceptual problems because it requires a court to parse its way through a number of
goals that may be advanced by any particular policy. Most laws advance a number of
goals and impose a multiplicity of different costs at the same time. The legislative
process is largely a process of balancing all these competing benefits and burdens in
the crucible of political bargaining to produce some policy outcome. The need to iden-
tify the goals of a state law, however, is mandated by Cipollone. In effect, the Court in
Cipollone concluded that Congress intended the preemptive effect of the Act to extend
only to attempts by states and cities to protect their citizens' health.
The problem of determining the preemptive effect of a federal law based on the
policy goal of the state arises whenever a state law has a "dual impact," i.e., it advanc-
es one goal of the state but it also has an impact in a different policy area. Thus, it is
useful to discuss briefly the Supreme Court's approach in these cases. When preemp-
tion is based on federal "occupation of the field," a court is called upon to determine
precisely what field has been occupied. Once that field has been identified, all state
laws in that field are completely displaced. 3
If Congress has occupied a particular field, and the scope of the state law is
quite similar, the question of preemption is usually easy. However, even though state
and federal law may overlap in subject matter, the state may assert that its policy is
not preempted because it is aimed at accomplishing a different policy goal. For exam-
ple, the state may assert that its policy is based on economic considerations, while
federal law is based on the goal of protecting health and safety. Moreover, the state
may make this claim even though its policy has some effect in the occupied field. The
10. Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 21 Cal. Rptx. 2d 232 (Cal. App. 1st. 1993); affd,
875 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1994); cert. denied, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Mangini, 115 S. Ct. 577
(1994).
11. Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 862 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Md. 1994), affd, 63
F.3d 1318 (4th Cit. 1995), cert. granted and judgment vacated by Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Schmoke,
116 S. Ct. 2575, affd on remand, 101 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 1996).
12. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Fourth Circuit in Penn Advertising for recon-
sideration in light of Liquormart. 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996). At the same time, it vacated a closely relat-
ed decision by the Fourth Circuit dealing with a restriction on alcohol advertising. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. v. Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996). On remand, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
both ordinances. Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 1996); Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996). The reasoning for both decisions on remand appears
in the Anheuser-Busch opinion. These cases are discussed more extensively in Parts IV and V.
13. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516; Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n, 505 U.S.
88, 98 (1992); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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Supreme Court has not had an easy time deciding whether the state policy is preempt-
ed when this "dual impact" situation has occurred. In theory, the preemptive effect of
any federal law is to be determined by reference to Congressional intent."4 In practice,
Congress may not have thought about preemption at all.
In general, the Court has followed two different approaches to preemption in
dual impact cases when Congress has occupied a particular policy field. The first has a
narrow preemptive effect, the second a broader one. The narrow preemptive approach
is to uphold a state law based on a different policy goal as long as there is no actual
conflict between federal and state policy." Moreover, the Court does not inquire into
the actual motive of the state policy-makers, but it will accept the stated purpose."
Even under this narrower approach, however, simply stating a different goal does not
save a statute from preemption. The state law may not frustrate the federal policy by
creating an actual conflict regardless of the asserted purpose.17
In a recent case, Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Association," the
Court discussed a broader preemptive approach in cases where a state law not only
affected an area occupied by federal policy but where the law was primarily limited to
this area. In that case, the Court said that a state law is preempted if it "directly, sub-
stantially and specifically regulates" the area occupied by federal policy. 9 However,
the Court commented that "laws of general applicability" are not preempted as long as
they do not create an actual conflict with federal law." In other words, the narrow
preemptive approach - based on a finding of an actual conflict - applies in dual
impact cases if the state law extends beyond the field occupied by federal policy. A
similar distinction appears in Cipollone where the Court distinguished between "gener-
al" laws that are not based on smoking and health, such as a bar on deception, and
more specific laws that are targeted to protecting public health."
But what makes a law "general," or at least not based on smoking and health?
The case law since Cipollone suggests that the identification of a non-health goal by
the state is only a starting point. In order to reach a sensible accommodation with
preemption concerns and the state's legitimate interests, courts have considered the
nature of the state's goal, the state law's effect and scope, and the degree to which it
threatens to create costly, conflicting state regulations before making a final determina-
14. Gade, 505 U.S. at 96.
15. See, e.g., Pacific, Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources Conservation Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190
(1983). In this case, California claimed that the non-safety purpose (requiring disposal of toxic waste
to allow economic planning) was not preempted, even though the federal policy occupied the field of
nuclear safety. Id. at 213-16. The Court upheld the California law on the grounds that the state law
advanced a non-safety goal and it was not in irreconcilable conflict with the safety policy of the NRC.
Id. at 216 & n.28.
16. Id. at 216 ("[I]nquiry into legislative motive is often an unsatisfactory venture.... What
motivates one legislator to vote for a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to
enact it.") (citation omitted).
17. Gade, 505 U.S. at 105-06. See also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971). In Perez, the
Court reviewed a state law preventing the discharge in bankruptcy of debts arising from judgments
relating to automobile accidents. The state argued that the statute advanced a different goal than the
federal bankruptcy laws by deterring irresponsible driving. Id. at 653-54. The Court found the law was
preempted because it created an actual conflict with the Federal Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 651-54. See
also Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 216, n.28.
18. Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
19. Id. at 107.
20. Id.
21. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528-29.
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tion about preemption. All these factors will be considered before concluding whether
or not a law is "based on smoking and health."
B. Is There a Legitimate Connection Between the Restriction and the Non-
health Goal?
Usually, the effectiveness of a state policy is not an issue in preemption analysis.
For example, if preemption is based on a conflict in law or policy, the question is
simply whether there is an actual conflict, not whether the state policy accomplishes its
goal. However, because Cipollone creates a somewhat unique form of express preemp-
tion, one which is based on the purpose of the law, courts must determine the basis of
the state's law. It is not enough simply for a state to declare that its policy advances a
non-health purpose.' The court will consider the purpose asserted by the state, but it
will also examine the substance, effect and scope of the law.23 By making these kinds
of inquiries, a court has a more solid basis for concluding that the state's restriction
should not more fairly be characterized as a health-based policy.
The need to show a genuine connection between the restriction and the non-
health goal does not present an additional burden for the state since a showing that the
restriction is likely to have some effect in advancing the non-health goal will be re-
quired as a matter of First Amendment analysis. In fact, the First Amendment burden
on the state to show the law's effect is likely to be greater than that required under a
preemption analysis.2 As a matter of preemption analysis, courts will simply require
some connection between the restriction and the non-health goal in the sense that it is
reasonable to assume that the restriction will advance the non-health objective.
C. Is the Law Reasonably Tailored to Accomplish the Non-health Goal?
An important consideration in determining the policy basis of a restriction is its
scope. The scope of the law is significant, not only because it provides an indicator of
the actual purpose of the state, but it goes to the heart of the underlying point of pre-
emption analysis. For better or worse, Congress appears to have reserved exclusively
for federal policy the regulation of the content of cigarette advertising in order to pro-
tect the public's health. While states and cities may adopt policies that have some
22. See, e.g., Vango Media, Inc. v. City of New York, 34 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1994). In Vango, the
City of New York had adopted an ordinance requiring that one public health message be displayed for
every four tobacco advertisements on certain property licensed by the city including taxicabs. A com-
pany in the business of displaying signs in taxicabs argued that the ordinance was preempted. The city
claimed that the basis of the law was economic since it was intended to prevent the costs of health
care benefits and lost productivity. Id. at 73. The court of appeals found that "almost all matters
touching on matters of public concern have an associated economic impact on society. But such eco-
nomic concern does not displace a local government's primary interest - whether it be public safety,
the common good, or in this case public health." Id. In other words, economic costs were simply one
undesirable effect of the underlying concern - the effect of smoking on the public's health.
23. In Vango, the statement of purpose by the city did recite the health risks of smoking. Id. at
72. The court of appeals commented that both the purpose and the effect of a state law must be
considered in determining whether it is preempted. Id. (citing Gade, 505 U.S. at 105). See also Chiglo
v. City of Preston, 909 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1995). The court concluded that an ordinance regulat-
ing cigarette advertising was primarily intended to protect the health of minors. Therefore, the ordi-
nance was preempted even if the city was pursuing an additional permissible goal, such as reducing
illegal purchases. See id. at 677.
24. See the discussion of First Amendment considerations in cases involving restrictions on adver-
tising aimed at protecting minors in Part V.
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effect on this advertising, a court will ask whether the scope of the law is consistent
with protecting health or some other goal.
The breadth of the restriction will be analyzed based on the products covered and
the type of advertising affected. If the scope of the law is consistent with some goal
other than protecting public health, a court is more likely to conclude that it is based
on a non-health goal. To take a simple example, a ban on all billboards within a city is
presumably based on aesthetic or environmental considerations. While such a law
might raise First Amendment concerns,' it would not be preempted. Similarly, a ban
on all deceptive advertising is based on a general "duty not to deceive" while a re-
quirement of health warnings in advertising would clearly be aimed at protecting the
public's health.26
D. Does the Law Impose Substantial Costs from a Multitude of Conflicting
State Regulations?
A fourth consideration is whether upholding the restriction will lead to a welter
of conflicting rules regarding the content of advertising across the country. To the
extent that it may, a court is more likely to find that a restriction is preempted. Courts
give weight to this consideration because the Congressional concern about conflicting
content regulations was the principal rationale for the preemption provision in the 1965
Act 7 and the 1969 Act.2" Consequently, a restriction that might be characterized as
based on a non-health goal is, nevertheless, more likely to be preempted if it substan-
tially undermines this core rationale.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS - AN OVERVIEW
Commercial speech has some constitutional protection.29 Courts are to apply
more than rational basis review, which asks only whether there is a rational argument
that any legitimate governmental interest is served.' On the other hand, commercial
25. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), cert. denied, 453 U.S.
922 (1981). In Metromedia, the Court reviewed a city ordinance regulating billboards. A majority of
the Court appeared prepared to uphold a broad ban on billboards. However, the ordinance suffered
from certain content-based restrictions which made it objectionable. See infra note 208.
26. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528-29 ("[P]etitioner's fraudulent misrepresentation claims that do arise
with respect to advertising and promotions (most notably claims based on allegedly false statements of
material fact made in advertisements) are not pre-empted by § 5(b). Such claims are predicated not on
a duty 'based on smoking and health' but rather on a more general obligation - the duty not to
deceive.").
27. Id. at 519 ("These regulatory actions [of the FTC and the states] animated the passage of § 5
[in the 1965 Act], which reflected Congress' effort to prevent a 'multiplicity of State and local regu-
lations pertaining to labeling of cigarette packages."') (citing H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
4 (1965)).
28. S. REp. No. 566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, at
2663 [hereinafter 1969 Senate Report] ("In some instances, counties or municipalities exercise their
authority over advertising by local ordinances, or regulations, or even occasionally by resolution. In
order to avoid the chaos created by a multiplicity of conflicting regulations, however, the bill preempts
State requirements or prohibitions with respect to the advertising of cigarettes based on smoking and
health.").
29. The Court first stated that commercial speech is entitled to some First Amendment protection
in the 1970s. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (error for lower courts to assume that com-
mercial speech has no First Amendment protection); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (state bar on truthful advertising of prescription drug
prices violates First Amendment).
30. Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2376 (1995). Under rational basis review,
1997]
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speech is subject to less demanding review than non-commercial speech.3 As is often
the case with laws that invoke medium scrutiny, outcomes of constitutional challenges
are hard to predict.
Since 1980, this intermediate scrutiny has been embodied in the four-part test of
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission." The
Court has frequently cited Central Hudson as the standard for analyzing all restrictions
on commercial speech, even speech that might be said to promote "socially harmful
activities."" The Central Hudson analysis asks four questions: 1) does the speech
qualify for constitutional protection? 2) is the asserted governmental interest substan-
tial? 3) does the restriction directly further the state's interest; and 4) is there is a rea-
sonable fit between the restriction and the state's goal?' 4 Each of these is discussed
below.
Despite the resilience of Central Hudson, the Court's most recent commercial
speech decision, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island," shows that several members
of the Court are prepared to apply a different analysis if the state is attempting to
reduce consumption of legal products by restricting advertising to adults. Moreover,
depending on how it is applied, Liquormart may lead courts to apply more demanding
scrutiny to many types of commercial speech restrictions. Thus, before I turn to the
basic First Amendment framework, it is useful to examine closely this important deci-
the Court traditionally has upheld a law based on interests that were not even asserted at the time the
law was enacted. See, e.g., Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767; United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) ("Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our in-
quiry is at an end. It is, of course, 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay
the legislative decision'. . . because this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its
reasons for enacting a statute.") (citation omitted). Moreover, as long as the connection between the
law and a legitimate interest is "at least debatable," the very deferential rational basis test is met. See,
e.g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348
U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
31. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1506 (1996); Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct.
at 2375. The Court has noted various justifications for commercial speech receiving less protection than
non-commercial speech. One consideration is that attempting to apply the same standards to both cate-
gories could dilute the protection of political and other non-commercial speech. Id. at 2375; Board of
Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1989). Another is that commercial speech is a "hardy breed of
expression that is not 'particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation."' Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980) (quoting Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)). A third consideration is that advertisers are well-
suited to evaluate the "accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity." Id.
See also Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 350 (1986).
32. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
33. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1590-91, n.2 (1995). In this case, the
government argued that speech promoting alcohol consumption or other socially harmful activities
should receive less protection than other commercial speech. The Court had appeared to endorse this
idea in two cases in which bans on some types of gambling advertising had been upheld. Posadas de
Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986); United States v. Edge
Broadcasting, 509 U.S. 418 (1993). However, the Court in Coors Brewing Co. specifically rejected this
argument. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1590, n.2 ("Neither Edge Broadcasting nor Posadas com-
pels us to craft an exception to the Central Hudson standard, for in both of those cases we applied
the Central Hudson analysis."). See also Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1513-14 (1996) (rejecting a special
standard for "vice" activity).
34. The original Central Hudson formulation required that the restriction was not "more extensive
than necessary" to serve the state's interest. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. This requirement was
relaxed in later cases to require only "a reasonable fit between the restriction and the government
interest that is "not necessarily perfect but reasonable." Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989).




A. The Impact of Liquormart
In Liquormart, the Court reviewed Rhode Island's sweeping ban on liquor price
advertising. The statute barred all references to price except for price tags or signs in
stores. A discount retailer advertised low prices for mixer and snack foods, and along-
side these displays it included the word "WOW" next to pictures of vodka and rum
bottles with identified brand names. This ad promoted enforcement proceedings by the
state liquor control authority, which fined the retailer."
The Justices were unanimous in striking down the statute. Eight Justices stated
expressly that the restriction failed one or more prongs of the Central Hudson test.37
However, the Court divided into two basic groups, one group that would abandon
Central Hudson when the state was not pursuing traditional consumer protection goals,
and the other group reserving judgment on whether to limit the reach of Central Hud-
son.
The principal opinion, written by Justice Stevens, distinguished between two
types of restrictions on commercial speech. This discussion, which is Part IV of his
opinion, was joined only by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg. Restrictions in the first
category are intended "to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive or aggressive
sales practices or [to require] the disclosure of beneficial information."3 Restrictions
in the second category prohibit the dissemination of "truthful, nonmisleading commer-
cial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process."39
The first category includes, for example, a prohibition on unfair solicitations by attor-
neys or a requirement that manufacturers disclose information about their products.
The second category includes state attempts to reduce consumption of a product by de-
priving "consumers of accurate information about their chosen products."' °
According to Justice Stevens, the first category warrants "less than strict review."
The second category does not." Moreover, bans in the second category are especially
troubling if they completely suppress speech by failing to leave open alternative ways
to disseminate a commercial message.'2 Stevens would limit Central Hudson's appli-
cability to the first category and apply conventional strict scrutiny to the second cate-
gory."3 Justice Thomas agreed with the distinction but argued that a ban on speech in
the second category should be per se unconstitutional.' It is clear that both Justice
36. Id. at 1501-03.
37. Id, at 1510 (Part V of the opinion by Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg,
JJ.); id. at 1515 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist,
CJ., Souter and Breyer, JJ.). Justice Thomas did not expressly apply Central Hudson to the facts.
38. Id. at 1507.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1508.
41. Id. at 1507.
42. See id. at 1507-08.
43. "When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from misleading, decep-
tive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the
purpose of its regulation is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional protection to com-
mercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict review. However, when a State entirely prohibits
the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preserva-
tion of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart form the rigorous review that the
First Amendment generally demands." 1d. at 1507.
44. "In cases such as this, in which the government's asserted interest is to keep legal users of a
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Stevens and Justice Thomas were worried about what they saw as paternalistic, state
attempts to change behavior by withholding information.
After advocating this partial abandonment of Central Hudson, Justice Stevens
went on to apply a traditional Central Hudson analysis to the Rhode Island law. He
concluded that it failed two prongs of the Central Hudson test. First, the state offered
insufficient evidence that the law substantially furthered the state's asserted interest of
reducing alcohol consumption.' In particular, the state had to show that consumption
would be reduced "significantly." Second, there were alternative ways of reducing
consumption without restricting speech, such as regulating or raising prices through
taxation.47 Thus, there was not a "reasonable fit" between the state's goal and the re-
striction."
Four Justices, O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Souter, and Breyer, concurred
with the result but saw no need to re-examine Central Hudson, since the statute failed
the Central Hudson test.49 The O'Connor opinion focused on the fourth prong of the
test - the requirement of a "reasonable fit" between the state's goal and its method.
Like Justice Stevens, O'Connor concluded that there were less restrictive ways to re-
duce consumption, including raising prices through taxation, limiting per capita pur-
chases, or conducting an educational campaign."° Both the Stevens and O'Connor
opinions expressly reject the principle, endorsed in Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, that the legislature has the discretion to choose between
an approach restricting speech and an equally effective alternative that does not restrict
speech.5" Both opinions also reject the theory espoused in Posadas that, since a state
can bar the sale of a product, it can take the "lesser" step of barring advertising about
it.
52
Liquormart shows that the Court may be poised to modify its approach to ana-
lyzing commercial speech. At least three Justices are highly skeptical of any attempt to
modify adult behavior by barring truthful advertising, and one is prepared to adopt a
rule flatly prohibiting it. Moreover, Liquormart can be read to endorse a more demand-
ing scrutiny of advertising restrictions than some prior cases have suggested. 53 I turn
product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the balancing test
adopted in [Central Hudson] should not be applied. . . rather such an 'interest' is per se illegitimate
and can no more justify regulation of 'commercial speech' than it can justify regulation of 'noncom-
mercial speech."' Id. at 1515-16.
45. Id. at 1509.
46. Id.
47. The opinion suggests, for example, maintaining higher prices through regulation or increased
taxation. Id. at 1510.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1522 ("Because Rhode Island's regulation fails even the less stringent standard set out
in Central Hudson, nothing here requires adoption of a new analysis for the evaluation of speech com-
mercial speech regulation."). Justice Scalia also (albeit unenthusiastically) retained the Central Hudson
test on the grounds that none of the parties had shown in their briefs why it should be abandoned. Id.
at 1515.
50. Id. at 1521-22.
51. Id. at 1511; id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court endorsed the idea of legislative
discretion in Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 344
(1986).
52. Id. at 1512. The O'Connor opinion does not make this point expressly, but it is implied from
its conclusion. See id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. Part V argues that Liquormart should not affect the analysis of restrictions on cigarette adver-
tising that affects minors.
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now to the Central Hudson framework, and how it is likely to be applied in the future.
B. Does the Speech Qualify for Constitutional Protection?
The Central Hudson formulation applies only to speech that is not deceptive and
concerns lawful activities.' In practice, most cigarette advertising will meet these
requirements and, therefore, qualify for constitutional protection.55
C. Is the Restriction Intended to Further a Substantial State Interest?
The burden on the state to show that a restriction is intended to further a sub-
stantial state interest is the least difficult of Central Hudson's requirements. Generally,
any legitimate interest asserted by the state will be accepted as substantial. For exam-
ple, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Court found that the federal government's
interest in preventing "strength wars" between brewers of beer was substantial.56 In
Penn Advertising, the court concluded that the governmental interest in preventing
minors from making illegal purchases of cigarettes was substantial.57
However, there are still some potential pitfalls in the state's identification of a
substantial interest. First, the Court will not uphold a law based on interests that were
not considered by the state.58 In contrast, the Court will uphold a law based on any
legitimate interest under rational basis review, even if the legislature did not consider
the interest at the time the law was enacted. 9 In addition, in reviewing restrictions on
commercial speech, the Court will look to the actual interests served, that is, the actual
purpose of the statute, not simply the purpose asserted by the state.' ° This last re-
quirement makes it particularly important that states and cities ensure that restrictions
on speech are genuinely aimed at non-health objectives.
D. Does the Restriction Directly Advance the Governmental Interest?
The Court has wavered in its description of the burden on the state to show that
a restriction on commercial speech accomplishes the state's goal. In some cases, the
Court appears to have adopted a more deferential approach, requiring little in the way
of an evidentiary showing that the law will be effective.61 On the other hand, some
54. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
55. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
56. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1591 (1995). However, the federal law at
issue, a regulation of the Treasury Department, failed other elements of the analysis. See infra notes
63-65, 83-84 and accompanying text.
57. Penn Advertising, 862 F. Supp. at 1406.
58. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993) ("In undertaking the [inquiry about the State's
interest], we must identify with care the interest the State itself asserts. Unlike rational basis review,
the Central Hudson standard does not permit us to supplant the precise interests put forward by the
State with other suppositions.") (citing Fox, 492 U.S. at 480).
59. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); United States v. Carolene
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938).
60. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 768 ("Neither will we turn away if it appears that the stated interests
are not the actual interests served by the restriction."). For this point the Court cited Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982), where the Court's concern was that the state, despite
its professed goal of separate and equal educational opportunities for men and women, might simply
intend to perpetuate a stereotype that nursing is a primarily female-dominated profession. These com-
ments suggest that the Court will look to the actual purpose of the legislature or other policy-making
body in reviewing a challenge based on the First Amendment. On the other hand, preemption analysis
has typically not attempted to assess the actual purpose of the legislature, but has been willing to rely
on the asserted purpose. See supra note 16.
61. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass'n. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986)
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cases have been more demanding.62
Recent cases illustrate the tension. In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,63 the Court
overturned a Treasury Department regulation barring the disclosure of alcoholic con-
tent on beer labels. A unanimous Court agreed that the regulation violated the First
Amendment because it did not directly advance the government's objective. ' This
conclusion was heavily influenced by the seeming irrationality of the scheme as well
as the lack of evidence of its effect.65 On the other hand, the Court took a more def-
erential approach in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.6 In that case, a divided Court
upheld a Florida Bar Association rule prohibiting attorneys from sending targeted
direct-mail solicitations to accident victims and their families for thirty days after the
accident. 7 In Liquormart, the Court again signaled a more demanding approach. Jus-
tice Stevens' opinion made a point of saying that the state must show the restriction
advances the state's interest "to a material degree.
68
Despite some inconsistency in these cases, some common themes emerge. A
state must ordinarily present some kind of evidence in the form of studies or surveys
to support a claim that its policy is effective.' The Court does not demand statistical
precision, as long as the study is a reasonable, good faith attempt to obtain informa-
tion.7" However, the Court has also said that some conclusions are warranted based
(upholding a ban on certain gambling advertising); United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. 418
(1993) (upholding a ban on certain lottery advertising).
62. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 761.
63. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
64. Id. at 1592; id. at 1594 (Stevens, J., concurring).
65. The regulation appeared to conflict with other federal policies. For example, alcohol content
was allowed to be displayed in advertising in most states and alcohol content was allowed on labels
of wines and distilled spirits, which have much higher percentages of alcohol. Id. at 1592-93.
66. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
67. Id. at 2381.
68. Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1509 ("In evaluating the ban's effectiveness in advancing the State's
interest, we note that a commercial speech regulation 'may not be sustained if it provides only inef-
fective or remote support for the government's purpose.' Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. For that
reason, the State bears the burden of showing not merely that its regulation will advance its interest,
but also that it will do so 'to a material degree.' Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771.").
69. In Edenfield, for example, where the state's restriction was struck down, the Court noted that
the state had presented no studies that personal solicitation by accountants created the danger of fraud
or overreaching. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771-72. On the other hand, in Florida Bar, where the restric-
tion was upheld, the state presented a study which purported to show that the public was losing confi-
dence in the legal profession from unseemly solicitations after accidents. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at
2377-78. The Court expressly contrasted this evidence with the lack of a study in Edenfield. Id. at
2377 ("[In Edenfield, we] observed that the State Board of Accountancy had 'presented no studies
that suggest personal solicitation of prospective business clients by CPAs creates the dangers of fraud,
overreaching or compromised independence that the Board claims to fear'. . . . Moreover, 'the record
[did] not disclose any anecdotal evidence, either from Florida or another state that validated the
Board's suppositions.") (citations omitted). The Court in Florida Bar also distinguished the empirical
support offered by Florida in support of its direct-mail ban from the lack of empirical evidence offered
by Kentucky in support of a direct-mail solicitation ban reviewed in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n.,
486 U.S. 466 (1988). "(Tlhe State in Shapero assembled no evidence attempting to demonstrate any
actual harm caused by targeted direct mail. The Court rejected the State's effort to justify a prophylac-
tic ban on the basis of blanket, untested assertions of undue influence and overreaching." (citations
omitted). Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2378-79.
70. Justice Kennedy's dissent in Florida Bar claimed that the sample survey and other evidence
assembled by the Bar Association were methodologically unsound and insufficient. "[The documents
submitted by the state] include no actual surveys, few indications of sample size or selection proce-
dures, no explanation of methodology, and no discussion of excluded results. There is no description
of the statistical universe or scientific framework that permits any productive use of the informa-
[Vol. 23:1
Cigarette Advertising
on accepted theories of human behavior and common sense.7 No empirical studies
are needed, for example, to conclude that advertising increases consumption to some
extent.' In Liquormart, Justice Stevens was willing to assume that a bar on price ad-
vertising will reduce consumption to some extent.73 However, at least in the case of
the Rhode Island statute, he would require the state to go further and show that an
advertising restriction "significantly" reduces consumption.74
Even if the government presents evidence in support of the effectiveness of the
restriction, the Court does not accept it at face value. Instead, the Court has relied on
the trial court to sift through the evidence and weigh conflicting testimony.7" The
Court continues to criticize government claims based on "anecdotal evidence and edu-
cated guesses.""
There is clearly some disagreement among members of the Court about how
much evidence of effect is required. The split in Florida Bar is a good illustration of
the tension. The majority was content with a survey prepared by the state bar associa-
tion, though it was far from being methodologically sound. The dissent would have
demanded a survey that was closer to meeting the standards of social science re-
search.' Coors Brewing Co. shows that the more illogical and self-contradictory the
regulatory scheme, the more skeptical the Court will be about the government's evi-
dence of effectiveness. Thus, the regulation in Coors Brewing Co. fell because of the
combination of what seemed to be an incoherent policy and thin empirical evidence of
effects.78 Liquormart shows that several Justices will demand more than common
sense behavioral assumptions in order to establish that at least some restrictions on
commercial speech significantly further the state's interest.'
tion .... " Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In response, the majority stated
that "we believe the evidence adduced by the Bar is sufficient to meet the standard elaborated in
Edenfield. . . . We do not read our case law to require that empirical data come to us accompanied
by a surfeit of background information. Indeed, in other First Amendment contexts, we have permitted
litigants to justify speech restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different lo-
cales altogether. . . or even, in a case applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on
history, consensus, and 'simple common sense'.... Nothing in Edenfield. . . requires more." Florida
Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2378 (citations omitted).
71. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
72. See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569 ("There is an immediate connection between ad-
vertising and demand for electricity. Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it
believed that promotion would increase sales.").
73. Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1509.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1593 (commenting on the district court's review
of the conflicting testimony presented).
76. Id. at 1593; see also Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71 ("[The government's] burden is not sat-
isfied by mere. . . conjecture; rather a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commer-
cial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alle-
viate them to a material degree.") (citations omitted).
77. See supra note 70.
78. See Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1593 ("These various tidbits [of evidence offered by
the government]. . .cannot overcome the irrationality of the regulatory scheme and the weight of the
record.").
79. I discuss below whether this more demanding scrutiny applies to restrictions on cigarette ad-
vertising that affects minors. See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
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E. Is There a Reasonable Fit Between the State's Regulation and the
Interest to Be Advanced?
The fourth prong of Central Hudson asks whether there is a reasonable fit be-
tween the restriction and the government's interest. The concern about "reasonable fit"
in commercial speech cases is related to the Court's overbreadth analysis in non-com-
mercial speech cases. The Court has frequently applied the doctrine of overbreadth to
strike down restrictions on non-commercial speech."0 The overbreadth doctrine is a
powerful tool for striking down laws since it is often possible to come up with a "less
restrictive alternative" to the one that emerged from the political process. No doubt in
part because of a concern about limiting the discretion of government policy-makers,
the Court substantially relaxed the "least restrictive alternative" test in Fox and re-
quired only that there be a "reasonable fit" between the restriction and the state's
goal.8 The Court reaffirmed this relaxed standard in Edenfield"
However, the "reasonable fit" standard can still be applied to overturn a restric-
tion on speech. In fact, it can make the state's burden an exceedingly difficult one. In
Coors Brewing Co., the Court concluded that a Treasury Department regulation violat-
ed the First Amendment in part because it was "not sufficiently tailored to its goal."83
The Court concluded that there were other ways to prevent "strength wars" besides
prohibiting the disclosure of alcoholic content on beer labels." Similarly in
Liquormart, both the Stevens and O'Connor opinions concluded that there were policy
alternatives that did not require restrictions on speech.85
IV. APPLYING THE PREEMPTION FRAMEWORK
The non-health goal that is the most promising basis for state and local regula-
tion of cigarette advertising is preventing minors from engaging in the illegal purchase
of cigarettes. This part applies the Cipollone preemption framework to this important
state goal. Part V applies the First Amendment framework.86
A. Is Preventing the Purchase of Illegal Products by Minors a Non-health
Goal?
The first question in a Cipollone preemption analysis is whether the state has
80. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973), the Court made clear that it would
strike down a law on this ground only if it was substantially overbroad.
81. See supra note 34.
82. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767 ("[L]aws restricting commercial speech, unlike laws burdening
other forms of protected expression, need only be tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a substan-
tial state interest in order to survive First Amendment scrutiny.") (citations omitted).
83. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1593.
84. In particular, the Court commented that "directly limiting the alcohol content of beers, prohib-
iting marketing efforts emphasizing alcohol strength. . .or limiting the labeling ban only to malt liquors
could "advance the Government's interest in a manner less intrusive to First Amendment rights." Id.
The Court cited no evidence for these assertions, nor did it discuss whether there were serious advan-
tages to them. They simply appear to have been suggestions by the beer manufacturers, which the
Court found appealing.
85. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
86. It is possible that other non-health goals might serve as the basis for restricting cigarette
advertising, such as a concern about safety, litter, or even competitive considerations. For example,
many states have laws regulating pricing and price advertising of cigarettes. However, essentially the
same framework as discussed in this paper would be applicable to laws in these other areas.
[Vol. 23:1
Cigarette Advertising
identified a non-health goal. The identification of a non-health goal is only the first
step in the preemption analysis. However, it is a crucial one since the court must be
convinced that the goal is not simply another way of stating the goal of protecting
health or an interest that stems directly from harmful effects on health."' The legisla-
tive body's statement of purpose is relevant but not dispositive.88
1. The Industry's Arguments
In order to see how these issues will arise in litigation, it is useful to review the
industry's arguments that these restrictions are preempted. The tobacco industry rejects
the idea that discouraging minors from purchasing cigarettes illegally is a non-health
goal. In effect, the industry argues that there is no reason that the state would discour-
age the illegal purchase of cigarettes other than its concern about the effects of ciga-
rettes on minors' health. Since federal policy is exclusive in this area, state laws are
preempted. 9
The industry concedes that a state could bar the sale of cigarettes to minors
outright without violating preemption standards.' It also concedes that a "general"
bar on advertising, e.g., a bar on advertising of all products on school grounds, would
not be based on smoking and health because it applies to all products. Since such a
law applies to products that do not endanger health, the state's goal must be to protect
the aesthetics of the school grounds, prevent the commercial exploitation of minors, or
advance some other non-health goal.
In addition, the industry concedes (as it must under Cipollone) that a general bar
on fraudulent misrepresentations is not preempted.9 ' However, according to the indus-
try, once the state enacts any restriction on advertising or marketing limited to ciga-
rettes, or regulates cigarette advertising on the grounds that it is unfair or exploits
minors, the law is preempted. This is so because the underlying concern is still the
health of minors, and the preemptive effect of the Act extends even to restrictions on
advertising that reaches only minors.' In support of this argument, the industry often
points to statements made during the enactment of a restriction, which indicate that
supporters of a restriction are concerned about minors' health.
A second argument that these restrictions are preempted is that Congress intend-
ed to preempt them along with other forms of cigarette advertising regulation. Since
restrictions on advertising aimed at protecting minors could result in burdensome,
conflicting requirements, they undermine the core rationale of the preemption provision
just as regulation of advertising aimed at protecting adults does. Moreover, so the
argument goes, the Congressional floor debate at the time of the 1969 amendments
indicates that Members of Congress were aware that the preemption provision in the
87. See, e.g., Vango, 34 F.3d at 73, where the court concluded that the city's professed concern
about the economic consequences of smoking was in substance a concern about one of the effects of
cigarettes on health.
88. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Respondents' Reply Brief on the Merits, at 14-15, Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobac-
co Co., 875 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1994) (No. S034603) [hereinafter RJR Reply Brief].
90. See id. at 11.
91. See id. at 12.
92. See id. at 12, n.12. This position is supported by some commentators. See, e.g., Kimberly K.
Kuhlengel, Note, A Failure to Preempt an Unfair Advertising Claim May Result in Undue Restrictions
on Cigarette Manufacturers, 19 S. ILL. U. L. J. 405 (1995).
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Act would prevent states from making certain disclosures aimed at children.9" For
example, an amendment was offered which would have allowed states to include dis-
closures that it is illegal for minors to purchase cigarettes.' The rejection of this
amendment meant that Congress expressly considered the possibility that states and
cities might regulate cigarette advertising to protect minors and chose to preclude it.
2. Responses to the Industry's Arguments
There are several responses to these arguments. First, the state goal of discourag-
ing the illegal purchase of cigarettes by minors is analytically distinct from the goal of
protecting their health. The Court in Cipollone distinguished between "general" duties,
not specific to smoking and health, and a duty to avoid endangering health. Although
this concept is not terribly precise, it captures the idea that there is some principal
objective that determines the scope and substance of a state policy.9" While the policy
may accomplish other goals, legislators have in mind some principal objective when
they adopt a policy. For example, when a legislature (or a court making common law)
adopts a bar on fraudulent statements, the underlying goal is to stop fraud, even though
it also accomplishes the secondary goal of barring false ads that might risk someone's
health.96 Thus, a restriction on advertising that discourages minors from engaging in
illegal purchases is not necessarily based on smoking and health, even if it has the
secondary effect of protecting health. The question is - what was the principal goal
underlying the policy when it was adopted.'
Seen in this light, it is clear that state laws barring minors from purchasing ciga-
rettes stem historically from a different primary goal than those that underlie disclosure
requirements intended to protect health. Cigarettes fall within a category of products
and activities, which, though lawful for adults, have been viewed as raising traditional
moral and ethical concerns. Most states, for example, prohibit minors from gambling,
purchasing pornography, purchasing alcoholic beverages, or entering places of enter-
tainment where nudity occurs. Such restrictions, including those on purchasing ciga-
rettes, were enacted long before cigarettes were recognized as a health hazard.9"
93. See RJR Reply Brief, supra note 89, at 3-5.
94. See 115 CONG. REc. 16,291 (1969) (amendment by Rep. Adams rejected by vote of 44-79).
95. Cipollone refers to this principal objective as the "legal duty that is the predicate" of a law.
See Cipollone 505 U.S. at 523-24 ("The central inquiry in each case is straightforward: we ask wheth-
er the legal duty that is the predicate of [the claim] constitutes a 'requirement or prohibition based
on smoking and health. . .imposed under State law with respect to. . .advertising or promotion,' giving
that clause a fair but narrow reading.").
96. See id. at 529 ("Thus, we conclude that the phrase 'based on smoking and health' fairly but
narrowly construed does not encompass the more general duty not to make fraudulent statements.").
97. Any law could be said to be based on some duty other than protecting health if one charac-
terized it as a specific application of some more general duty. To push the point to the limit, all laws
could be said to be specific applications of some very general principle - e.g., a duty to be fair or a
duty to use resources efficiently. Thus, there will be disagreements as to the appropriate level of gen-
erality at which one should view the restriction. Justice Blackmun in Cipollone, for example, argued
that a failure to warn claim was not specific to the protection of health. Instead, it "could just as
easily be described as based on a 'more general obligation' to inform consumers of known risks ...
" Id. at 543 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part). Consequently, the scope and
overall effect of the law must be examined to identify the level of generality that is most appropriate.
98. See, for example, the discussion of the origins of California law in Mangini, 875 P.2d at 81.
The restriction on the sale of tobacco to minors was enacted in 1891 and appears in the same chapter
of the California code as the restrictions on admitting minors to houses of prostitution and admitting a
minor to a cockfight. As the court commented, this history "shows the state's protective role, and not
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While some of these laws also protect minors' health, it is fair to say that the protec-
tion of health was not the principal objective at the time they were adopted - or in
Cipollone's terms, the "legal duty that is the predicate" of the law.99
As a practical matter, a law prohibiting the advertising of cigarettes to minors
protects their health as well as discourages illegal purchases. Thus, it is not surprising
that the Court of Appeals in Mangini commented extensively on the connection be-
tween the alleged unfair practice and the effect on minors' health."u R.J. Reynolds
seized on these comments to claim that the whole point of the state law restriction was
to protect minors' health.' The California Supreme Court rejected this argument on
the grounds that the original bar on the sale of cigarettes was based on the state's "pro-
tective role," not on protecting health, and that Cipollone had concluded restrictions
based on these general duties were not preempted."°m
The statements made by legislators or others at the time of enactment have also
not been dispositive in determining the basis of the law. For example, when the Balti-
more City Council considered the bar on billboard advertising of cigarettes and alco-
hol, which was reviewed in Penn Advertising, a number of comments were made about
the beneficial health effects of the proposed ordinance."m The industry pointed to
these comments to argue that the basis of the ordinance was protecting health. The
district court rejected the argument on the grounds that the purpose of the law must be
determined based on its language, not on the basis of statements by individual legisla-
tors. 1
In effect, the district court in Penn Advertising concluded that simply reciting
health concerns as one of the underlying motivations for a law is not synonymous with
identifying the "basis" of the law. Instead, the basis of the law is most fairly deter-
mined by the purpose asserted in the text of the law, its substance and its scope. This
approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's approach to statutory interpretation in
preemption cases, which has cautioned against attempting to divine the actual purpose
of legislators."
primarily health concerns, motivated the prohibition against selling cigarettes to minors." Id. Similarly,
in Penn Advertising, the restriction on the sale of cigarettes to minors was originally enacted in 1886.
Penn Advertising, 862 F. Supp. at 1417. The court commented on the fact that medical studies linking
smoking and health were not published until the 1920's. Id.
The district court in Penn Advertising commented that, even if the 1886 bar on purchasing
cigarettes was based on smoking and health, a law designed to effectuate the law was not. Id. This
line of reasoning is more doubtful since it draws a rather artificial line between laws protecting health
and laws intended to effectuate laws protecting health. However, a court does not have to go that far
to conclude that a law enacted to effectuate a law intended to protect the morals of minors is not
based on smoking and health.
99. See supra note 95.
100. See Mangini, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 241-42. For example, the court of appeal commented that
the "targeting of minors is oppressive and unscrupulous, in that it exploits minors by luring them into
an unhealthy and potentially life-threatening addiction before they have achieved the maturity necessary
to make an informed decision whether to take up smoking despite its health risks." Supra note 9, at
241-42.
101. See RJR Reply Brief, supra note 89, at 14-15.
102. Mangini, 875 P.2d at 81.
103. For example, the Chairman of the Council and the Commissioner of Health both commented
on the relationship of the proposal to health. Penn Advertising, 862 F. Supp. at 1418.
104. Id. at 1419. ("The City clearly stated what its purpose was in promulgating Ordinance 307: to
effectuate § 404. Therefore, this Court need look no further that the language of Ordinance 307.")
105. The district court relied on Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensa-




The legislative history of both the original Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
tising Act,'" enacted in 1965, and the 1969 amendments, were responses to initia-
tives by federal agencies, and to a lesser extent, the states. In both cases, there was a
legislative compromise. Opponents of regulation managed to put some limits on initia-
tives to regulate cigarette advertising, but Congress also codified other restrictions,
including warning labels on packages in 1965 and a ban on radio and television adver-
tising in 1969."°
The original federal effort to regulate cigarette advertising began in 1964 when
the FTC adopted a rule requiring warnings, not only on packages, but in advertising as
well."0 ' The 1965 Act was an effort to limit the impact of the FrC's actions on the
industry, particularly to preclude a rule requiring disclosures in advertising. However,
the Act's provisions terminated in 1969, and the FTC once again considered a rule on
advertising disclosures."m In addition, the Federal Communications Commission an-
nounced that it would consider a rule banning all forms of cigarette advertising on
radio and television. Some states also appeared ready to begin regulation of cigarette
advertising."' The 1969 Act was concerned primarily with efforts by the federal
agencies, and to a lesser extent, efforts by the states. The Act's response to federal
efforts was to ban electronic advertising altogether and to postpone the FTC's
rulemaking proceedings."'
The Congressional response to state efforts was more ambiguous. The bill
amending the 1965 Act, H.R. 6543, did not modify the 1965 Act's preemption provi-
sion when it reached the floor of the House. Thus, it simply continued to preclude
additional federal or locally-mandated disclosures on packages or in advertising."'
The industry points to the rejection of an amendment offered in the House by Rep.
Adams to argue that Congress intended to preempt state regulations intended to protect
minors.' The amendment offered by Rep. Adams would have allowed states and
cities to require a disclosure in advertising that purchase of cigarettes by minors is ille-
gal." 4 The floor comments in opposition to this amendment focused on the concern
it is unambiguous on the point at issue. Penn Advertising, 862 F. Supp. at 1418. As discussed earlier,
the Court has not looked to the actual purpose of policy-makers in preemption cases, but instead has
accepted their asserted purpose. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 4. The Act is now codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1994).
107. The industry probably favored the 1969 Act's ban on advertising on radio and television over
possible anti-smoking commercials required by the FCC under the Fairness Doctrine. See, e.g., Kenneth
L. Polin, Argument for the Ban of Tobacco Advertising: A First Amendment Analysis, 17 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 99, 102 (1988).
108. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 513.
109. Id. at 513-15.
110. The California Senate, for example, had passed a total ban on print and electronic cigarette
advertisements. The regulatory initiatives preceding the 1969 Act are described in Cipollone. See id. at
514-15, n.11.
111. See id. at 515.
112. The 1969 amendments embodied in H.R. 6543 did not modify the preemption provision in the
original 1965 Act other than to further postpone the termination date of the provision as it related to
federal regulation of cigarette advertising until July 1, 1975. See H.R. REP. No. 289, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 House Report]. The Court in Cipollone concluded that the 1965 pre-
emption provision "merely prohibited state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating particular
cautionary statements on cigarette labels (§ 5(a)) or in cigarette advertising (§ 5(b))." 505 U.S. at 518.
113. See, e.g., RJR Reply Brief, supra note 89, at 4.
114. The amendment provided:
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that it could lead to conflicting disclosures in national or regional advertising. Adver-
tisers could not disseminate advertising copy, which would reach the entire nation or at
least more than one state.15 Thus, the objection was similar to the traditional concern
about burdening interstate commerce by subjecting national sellers to conflicting local
requirements."' The Adams amendment was an attempt to create a single exception
to this bar on additional disclosure requirements.1 7
Thus, at the very most, the rejection of the Adams amendment meant that the
House intended to preclude states from requiring additional warnings in advertising to
protect minors. The amendment did not address non-content regulations, such as re-
strictions on location, nor did it address highly localized promotional practices such as
the distribution of free samples or billboards. Moreover, the entire discussion took
place in the context of a debate about mandatory advertising disclosures. It did not
address other efforts by the states to protect minors that do not require affirmative
advertising disclosures, including those which might affect the content of advertising.
The Senate adopted a broader preemption provision, which was described in the
Senate Commerce Committee report accompanying H.R. 6543 when it was reported to
the Senate.1 8 The conference committee adopted the Senate version." 9 Both the
House and Senate debates on H.R. 6543, as well as the debates on the conference
report, show that the principal concern was that states and cities would enact conflict-
ing regulations regarding the content of advertising, particularly conflicting disclosure
requirements. 2 ° Conflicting requirements would make it difficult, if not impossible,
[The preemption subsection] does not prevent any State or political subdivision thereof,
which prohibits the sale of cigarettes to persons below certain ages, from requiring that
any cigarette advertisement within its jurisdiction set forth the fact that persons below a
certain age are prohibited by such State or political subdivision from purchasing ciga-
rettes.
115 CONG. REc. 16,290 (1969).
115. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REc. at 16,291 (1969) ("This amendment, if added to this bill, would
create utter chaos, and virtually make impossible nationally broadcast programs or the dissemination of
nationally published magazines, and indeed many locally published newspapers. Imagine 50 different
advertising formats in a nationally broadcast program . . . . Variations in State laws prohibiting sales
to minors are well known . . . . These same variations would render it impossible to have printed
cigarette advertisements in national publications, and in most local newspapers which enjoy any sub-
stantial out-of-state circulation.") (comments of Rep. Fountain).
116. See id. ("To put this burden on the advertising of a product that may be lawfully sold is not
only punitive but also wholly unwarranted. In fact, it would be an undue burden on interstate com-
merce.") (comments of Rep. Fountain).
117. The amendment was offered in Committee as well. See the comments of opponents of the bill
in the 1969 House Report at 32-33 ("One of the most objectionable parts of H.R. 6543 is that it
continues the present law which prevents any of the government agencies, Federal, State, or local,
from requiring health warnings [in] cigarette advertising . . . [A]n amendment was offered [in Commit-
tee] so that the States and localities might require that advertising contain a warning that it is a crime
to sell cigarettes to minors . . . . The reported bill would prevent the States from giving notice in
advertising that the State criminal law is being violated through the sale and use of cigarettes by
minors.") (Minority views of Mr. Jarman, Mr. Dingell and Mr. Adams).
118. See 1969 Senate Report, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2663 ("In order to avoid the chaos created by
a multiplicity of conflicting regulations . . . the bill preempts State requirements or prohibitions with
respect to the advertising of cigarettes based on smoking and health.").
119. CoNF. REP. No. 897, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2676, 2677 [here-
inafter 1969 Conf. Rep.] ("The Senate preemption [provision] applied only to States and their political
subdivisions. They were prevented from imposing any requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health on advertising and promotion of cigarettes in packages labeled in accordance with the Act.
With minor technical amendments the conference version is the same as the Senate amendment.").
120. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REc. 38,738 (1969) ("The committee [bill] preempts all State and local
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to engage in national advertising or to disseminate advertising copy to regional adver-
tising media.' On the other hand, most of the floor comments do not indicate a
broad-based concern about all forms of advertising regulations, including regulations
on local advertising that do not raise costs to advertisers because it must already be
tailored to local markets."z Thus, the predominant concern in 1969, as in 1965, is
stated in the preamble section of the 1965 Act, which was not changed by the 1969
amendments.' 3
There are other reasons to conclude that Congress did not have all forms of state
advertising restrictions in mind when it adopted the preemption provision in the 1969
Act. The Senate Report expressly affirms the power of states to regulate the "sale of
cigarettes to minors."" Arguably, this phrase refers to regulations of the promotion
of cigarettes to minors as well as the sale itself"' The industry's counter-argument is
that the phrase is limited to the prohibition of sale of cigarettes, not the advertising of
the sale.
2 6
A stronger argument is the failure of any mention during the Congressional de-
bates about preventing the states from regulating blatant commercial appeals to minors
even though at least one state at the time had laws restricting cigarette advertising
directed to minors. For example, a Utah statute barring all billboards and public dis-
plays of tobacco advertising had been in existence for half a century at the time of the
health-related regulation of cigarette advertising, based upon the principle of national uniformity in
regulating the marketing of nationally marketed products.") (Comments of Senator Magnuson, Chairman
of the Senate Commerce Committee).
121. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 7920 (1970) ("The [Conference Committee] agreement contains [a]
preemption [provision] applicable to States and their political subdivisions in recognition of the fact
that the labeling, advertising, promotion and sale of cigarettes insofar as they are related to smoking
and health are matters of national concern. The legislation makes clear that in order to make the legis-
lation effective, States and their local divisions are not to interfere with the scheme of regulation pro-
vided for in the legislation.") (Comments of Rep. Staggers, Chairman of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce); id. at 7921 ("In order the preserve the effectiveness of Federal
legislation, State and local jurisdictions are not by regulation or prohibition to expand, duplicate,
change Federal regulation in any way or to reduce the legal or practical effectiveness of the warning
statement imposed by section 4, or to otherwise interfere with this legislation.") (Comments of Rep.
Satterfield, a member of the Conference Committee, regarding the Conference Committee Report).
122. This issue is discussed further below. See infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
123. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1995):
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to establish a
comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with re-
spect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby . . . (2) commerce and
the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this
declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette
labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and
health.
124. See S. REP. No. 566, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652,
2663. The excerpt states:
The State preemption of regulation or prohibition with respect to cigarette advertising is
narrowly phrased to preempt only State action based on smoking and health. It would in
no way affect the power of any State or political subdivision of any State with respect
to the taxation or sale of cigarettes to minors, or the prohibition of smoking in public
buildings, or similar police regulations. It is limited entirely to State or local require-
ments or prohibitions in the advertising of cigarettes.
125. This was the conclusion of the California Supreme Court in Mangini. Mangini, 875 P.2d at
81. The court also was impressed by the fact that the cigarette industry during the hearings preceding
the 1969 amendments pledged to avoid advertising directed to young persons. Id. at 81-82.
126. See RJR Reply Brief, supra note 89, at 5-6.
[Vol. 23:1
Cigarette Advertising
1969 amendments. 2 7 There is reference during the Congressional debates to the ex-
traordinary step of overturning such a state law.' The Supreme Court has sometimes
stated that a failure of Congress to comment on what would amount to a drastic
change in law suggests that it did have this change in mind.129
Finally, it is unreasonable to assume that Congress believed that advertising
disclosures would be the exclusive method of preventing unfair promotion of cigarettes
to minors. Minors are assumed to be unable to evaluate the complex, conflicting mes-
sages in advertising, which simultaneously glamorize smoking and warn of its serious
hazards to health. Disclosures are made in advertising that, even according to the in-
dustry, has its primary effect on adults. No sensible government policy would rely
exclusively on such disclosures to protect minors from blatant commercial appeals.
Such a limitation would mean that cigarette manufacturers could distribute coupons for
free cigarettes next to school grounds, on the theory that minors would see disclosures
of health hazards when they read news magazines. Thus, while Congress may have
wished to preclude states from burdening manufacturers with additional mandated
disclosures in advertising, it is unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to pre-
clude the states from doing anything else.
The industry has argued that Congress intended that the exclusive authority to
protect minors from such blatant appeals was left with the Federal Trade Commis-
sion." This is, of course, an appealing result to the industry since it allows the in-
dustry to concentrate its lobbying and political efforts at restraining a single agency,
rather than engaging in political battles with fifty state legislatures and hundreds of city
councils. There are some general comments in the legislative history, which suggest a
broad-brush intent to preempt all state regulation."' Nevertheless, it is doubtful Con-
gress intended that the FFC would be the exclusive repository of authority to regulate
all cigarette advertising, including localized, blatant commercial appeals to minors.' 2
The extreme implications of the tobacco industry's position have made it difficult
for courts to accept its arguments. For example, the California Supreme Court in
127. The statute's constitutionality was upheld in Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932). How-
ever, the Court did not address First Amendment issues. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 498.
128. One of the strongest opponents of H.R. 6543 as it emerged from the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee was Senator Frank Moss of Utah. One of his objections to the bill focused on the delay in the
date at which the ban on broadcast advertising of cigarettes would go into effect. See S. REP. NO.
566, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17-24 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2668-75 (individual
views of Mr. Moss). It is almost inconceivable that he could have assumed that his state's long-stand-
ing bar on other forms of advertising was to be preempted without mentioning this possibility.
129. See, e.g., City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 68 (1988); United Savings Ass'n v. Tim-
bers of Inwood Forest Ass'n, 484 U.S. 365, 380 (1988); Church of Scientology v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9,
17-18 (1987).
130. See RJR Reply Brief, supra note 89, at 6-7.
131. See, e.g., a colloquy involving Senator Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Commit-
tee:
Mr. Cooper: Mr. President, I wish to ask [Senator Magnuson], the manager of the report,
questions for interpretation. As I understand the conference report, it preempts the States
from any action restricting advertising.
Mr. Magnuson: Yes.
116 CONG. REc. 6640 (1970).
132. As the Court has frequently stated, Congress should not be presumed to have displaced state
authority. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 780 (1947) ("Any indulgence in construction should be
in favor of the States, because Congress can speak with drastic clarity when in chooses to assure full
federal authority, completely displacing the States.") (Frankfurter, J., sep. opinion).
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Mangini concluded that the industry's position would mean that the state could not
regulate blatant commercial appeals to children.' The industry, in fact, has not been
anxious to state the full implications of its arguments."M
4. Achieving a Sensible Accommodation
There are a number of strong arguments that state regulation of unfair practices,
including advertising of cigarettes directed to minors, is not based on protecting health.
On the other hand, the courts are not likely to accept the argument that any regulation
of advertising is not preempted as long as it is intended to discourage children from
making illegal purchases. To push the argument to the limit would mean that a state
could require affirmative disclosures in advertising if the asserted goal was to discour-
age minors from buying cigarettes. While such a policy might legitimately be said to
be based on a non-health goal, it also raises serious conflicts with the core rationale of
the preemption provision in the 1969 Act.
Thus, courts are likely to search for a sensible accommodation of these compet-
ing concerns. Although it may not be analytically precise, courts are likely to inter-
twine their analysis of whether a restriction is based on the non-health goal of protect-
ing minors with the other factors suggested in Part II, above: whether there is a legiti-
mate connection between the restriction and the non-health goal, whether the restriction
is reasonably tailored to accomplish the goal, and whether it raises a serious risk of
conflicting regulations. The ultimate decision about preemption will turn on a consider-
ation of all these factors.
B. Is There a Legitimate Connection between the Restriction and the Non-
Health Goal of Protecting Minors?
In assessing whether a particular restriction on the promotion of illegal products
to minors can fairly be said to be based on a non-health objective, a court will ask
whether there is a legitimate connection with this objective. This assessment requires at
least some examination of the reasoning of the state or city in enacting the restriction.
The cases so far suggest that courts are likely to require only some legitimate connec-
tion between the restriction and the asserted governmental interest. Courts have not
required evidence of effectiveness for purpose of a preemption analysis in part because
some showing of likely effectiveness will have to be met under a First Amendment
analysis in any event. If the state law survives First Amendment scrutiny, it will surely
meet any requirement of a legitimate connection or nexus for purposes of preemption
analysis.
In determining whether there is a legitimate connection, courts will look at the
133. Mangini, 875 P.2d at 79. ("Reynolds contends that, in effect, that if it had used billboards
depicting Old Joe Camel stating in huge block letters, 'Kids, be the first in your fourth grade class
cool enough to smoke Camels;' or, to use the example of the Court of Appeal, if 'Reynolds had .-
. . presented Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles on children's lunch boxes to promote cigarette smoking,'
California could do nothing about it . . . . As we will indicate, Reynolds is incorrect. California may,
consistently with section 1334(b), shield minors from cigarette advertising inducing them to smoke.")
134. For example, the plaintiffs in Mangini argued that the industry's position would mean that a
state could not bar cigarette advertising on or near schoolgrounds. Reynold's response was only that no
commercial signs of any kind are allowed under a San Francisco ordinance. See RJR Reply Brief,
supra note 89, at 11. Reynolds did not directly address the result in a case where there was no such
ordinance.
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purpose of the law as stated by the legislative body that enacted it, the substance and
scope of the law, and the state's theory of why it will accomplish the stated objective.
The district court in Penn Advertising pointed to the stated purpose of the ordinance,
the scope and the data showing the prevalence of underage smoking to find a legiti-
mate connection.'3" The court of appeals apparently viewed the connection between
the protection of minors and the bar on outdoor signs in residential areas as obvious.
Its comments about the effects of the law were confined to its First Amendment analy-
sis.
36
In Mangini, the California Supreme Court addressed only whether the plaintiffs
claim was not preempted as a matter of law.137 Thus, for purposes of the opinion, it
assumed that the plaintiffs claim - the use of the Joe Camel character in advertising
"targets" minors - was true. Therefore, the nexus between the restriction on such
advertising and the non-health goal was obvious, at least for purposes of summary
judgment.'
In other cases, the connection between the non-health goal of protecting minors
and the restriction may not be so obvious. For example, a court may question whether
a ban on advertising at sporting events or a ban on advertising in places where alcohol
is served has a significant connection. This inquiry is likely to focus on the scope of
the law and the extent to which it is tailored to protect minors, which are discussed
below.
C. Is the Restriction Reasonably Tailored to the Non-health Goal?
The third consideration in the preemption analysis is whether the restriction is
reasonably tailored to the non-health goal of protecting minors. The more the policy
appears to interfere with an area that is governed exclusively by federal policy - the
health effects of cigarette advertising - the more it intrudes upon the federal preroga-
tives and the more likely it is to be pre-empted. Thus, a law can be preempted if it
appears to regulate the content of cigarette advertising directed to adults. It can also be
preempted if it appears simply intended to protect children's health from the effect of
cigarettes. The literal breadth of the policy is not conclusive. Each policy must be
analyzed from the point of view of the purpose for which it is adopted.
For example, compare a ban on cigarette billboards overlooking a schoolground,
a ban on cigarette billboards in an entire city, and a ban on all billboards in the city.
The ban on cigarette advertising overlooking a schoolground is almost precisely tai-
lored to prevent the marketing of illegal products to minors since the overwhelming
majority of persons who see the billboards will be children. Even this kind of restric-
tion may not be viewed as based on a non-health goal, however, since a court might
ask why the ban doesn't extend to other illegal products, such as alcohol. On the other
hand, a court is more likely to uphold a restriction on advertising targeted to minors if
135. Penn Advertising, 862 F.Supp. at 1417 ("It is clear that Ordinance 307 is [not based on
smoking and health]. The purpose of Ordinance 307 is to further effectuate § 404, a valid State law.
The Preamble to Ordinance 307 cites § 404 as the impetus for its promulgation along with abundant
statistics concerning the prevalence of underage smoking to demonstrate the necessity of Ordinance 307
as a means to increase the effectiveness of § 404.").
136. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1325.
137. Mangini, 875 P.2d at 74.
138. On remand, the burden on the plaintiffs to prove effect, particularly for purposes of a First
Amendment analysis, is unclear. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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it is a specific application of a more "general" bar on the promotion of illegal prod-
ucts. The scope of the law would be assessed on the basis of the general bar, not the
specific application.'39
The ban on all cigarette billboards in the city also protects children from the
promotion of illegal products, but it raises two problems. First, if it is truly limited to
cigarette advertising, and does not address other illegal products, it may appear to be
based only on the goal of protecting health. Second, to the extent that it prevents adults
from seeing the billboards, the effect of the restriction extends beyond the asserted
state goal. Finally, the ban on all billboards in the city would not be preempted, though
it might raise First Amendment concerns."4 Its very breadth indicates that it is based
on a concern other than health, such as aesthetics or environmental considerations. In
short, the literal breadth of the law is not dispositive, since the bar on all billboards in
the city in this example is the broadest restriction of all. Rather, the question is wheth-
er the law is based on a non-health goal.
In Mangini, the relief requested by the plaintiff was a specific application of a
general bar on unfair practices. Therefore, the court was able to conclude that the
plaintiffs theory was fairly tailored to this non-health goal. The court's focus then was
on the scope of the general bar, not the scope of the specific application. 4' The
Court of Appeal in Mangini also concluded that plaintiffs theory was a specific appli-
cation of the general bar, which was based on a non-health goal. 42
In Penn Advertising, the specific ordinance at issue was limited to cigarette ad-
vertising. The ordinance more clearly restricted advertising aimed at adults since adults
are probably. the principal targets of billboard advertising. Thus, Penn Advertising
presented a harder case than did Mangini. Nevertheless, both lower courts concluded
that the ordinance was reasonably tailored to the non-health goal of discouraging ille-
gal purchases by minors. It represented a reasonable attempt to restrict advertising that
was particularly likely to reach children and to avoid restricting advertising that would
not.43 While it was not discussed expressly in either opinion, it was also significant
that the city had enacted a parallel ordinance aimed at alcohol advertising." Thus,
the city did not have to deal with the argument that such an ordinance should extend
139. This is the case in Mangini. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Metromedia, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). In Metromedia, a majority of the Court appeared
prepared to uphold a ban on commercial billboards, but the ordinance under review was struck down
because it created certain classifications between permissible and impermissible messages based on their
content. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
141. Mangini, 875 P.2d at 80. ("[lIt is unlawful in California to sell cigarettes to minors or for
minors to buy them. Advertising aimed at such unlawful conduct would assist vendors in violating the
law. The predicate duty is to not engage in unfair competition by advertising illegal conduct or en-
couraging others to violate the law.").
142. Mangini, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d at 243.
143. See Penn Advertising, 63 F.2d at 1323. The district court stressed that the ordinance was
limited to "billboards in neighborhoods in which children would typically be found such as the areas
in which they live, attend school, and recreate." Penn Advertising, 862 F. Supp. at 1414. In addition,
the ordinance was "narrowly tailored in that it applies only to a narrow medium, billboards, which are
particularly problematic in that they are easily accessible to children and parents lack control over their
children's exposure to such advertising. [The ordinance] has no effect upon other mediums which do
not cause these specific problems, such as newspapers, magazines, and signs inside licensed premises.
[Thus, the ordinance] is clearly aimed at the illegal sale of cigarettes to minors." Id. at 1417.
144. This ordinance was reviewed in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 855 F. Supp.
811 (D. Md. 1994), affd, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. granted and judgment vacated by
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 1821, affd on remand, 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996).
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beyond only one illegal product.
D. Does the Restriction Risk Substantial Costs from Conflicting
Regulations?
A final question in applying the Cipollone framework is whether the State's
restriction threatens to impose substantial costs on the industry from conflicting state
and local requirements. Congress certainly had this concern in mind when it passed the
1969 Act. This was most clearly reflected in a desire to avoid a multiplicity of stand-
mandated affirmative disclosures, which might make national advertising impossible as
a practical matter.45 Thus, the Court in Cipollone assumed that tort theories based on
an alleged failure to include warning disclosures would fly in the face of Congressio-
nal intent. In contrast, state restrictions on outright fraud would not raise the same risk
because there is "only a single, uniform standard: falsity."'
Guided by Cipollone, every court that has considered a preemption challenge to a
state or local restriction has placed significant weight on whether upholding it would
lead to conflicting regulations of the content of advertising. In Mangini, the California
Supreme Court acknowledged the Congressional concern about conflicting regulations
of cigarette advertising. 41 However, it concluded that the remedy sought by the
plaintiff would not lead to conflicting regulations within the meaning of the preemption
provision.48
On this issue, Penn Advertising presented an easier case than Mangini. Arguably,
a ban on cartoon characters places a burden on national advertisers because it prevents
national or regional dissemination of particular advertising copy. 49 In contrast, a ban
on the location of signs in a local area results in additional costs to advertisers. Thus,
both courts in Penn Advertising easily concluded that a ban on billboard advertising in
certain areas did not impose any costs from conflicting regulations on the content of
advertising.'
The industry has argued that State standards based on unfairness would result in
a multitude of conflicting policies and, thus, undermine the core Congressional ratio-
nale underlying the preemption provision. For example, the industry has argued that
states might apply different standards of proof in deciding what is unfair. Some might
require proof of intentional targeting of minors, some might require only proof that
minors might be affected by certain advertising, and so on. Similarly, some states
might bar cartoon characters while others might focus on littering, safety or other
145. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
146. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 529.
147. Mangini, 875 P.2d at 80.
148. Id. at 80 ("State law prohibitions against advertisements targeting minors do not require
Reynolds to adopt any particular label or advertisement 'with respect to any relationship between
smoking and health'; rather, they forbid any advertisements soliciting unlawful purchases by minors.
The prohibitions do not create 'diverse, nonuniform, and confusing' standards.") (quoting Cipollone,
505 U.S. at 512). Reynolds also argued that at least remedies that threatened more serious conflicts,
such as a requirement of additional warnings, would be preempted. Id. at 83. The court commented
that the issue of the precise form of relief was not yet before it. Id.
149. Cipollone makes clear that a flat prohibition is less costly to advertisers than inconsistent
affirmative requirements. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 529.
150. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1324; 862 F. Supp. at 1420 ("Ordinance 307 does not require




The type of state restriction that raises the clearest potential for conflict with
Federal policy is a requirement of affirmative disclosures in advertising prepared for
mass circulation. This is true even if the affirmative disclosure is aimed only at chil-
dren. A multiplicity of inconsistent State-mandated disclosures would make it difficult
for a manufacturer to disseminate any advertisement in a national publication. An
analogous concern arises in determining whether a State restriction places an "undue"
burden on interstate commerce. State laws may impose substantial costs on national
manufacturers by requiring them to tailor product or other standards to numerous con-
flicting, local requirements.'
On the other hand, restrictions aimed at local advertising and marketing practic-
es, for example, flyers, promotional handouts, billboard advertising, etc., already must
be tailored for local markets. Thus, different state laws do not substantially raise the
costs to manufacturers. Similarly, restrictions that are framed as prohibitions, rather
than affirmative obligations, are less likely to impose burdens on manufacturers, be-
cause they can more easily comply with the requirements imposed by several
states."'
Cipollone suggested that there is a bright line between policies that lead to con-
flicting state standards and those that do not. In particular, it suggested that a bar on
deception would not lead to conflicting standards, while state-mandated affirmative
disclosures would." Such an analysis substantially oversimplifies the law of decep-
tion. Traditionally, there is no clear line between an advertisement that is deceptive
because it fails to contain a disclosure and one that is deceptive because it makes an
affirmative misrepresentation.'55 Moreover, state bars on deception may be imple-
mented in many different ways. For example, states may have quite different views
about what ads represent in the first place. Two states may evaluate the same adver-
tisement and reach different conclusions about whether it is deceptive. In short, there is
some potential for conflicts among state policies in imposing a "general duty not to de-
ceive" just as there may be in barring unfair practices.
The most sensible reconciliation of these conflicting arguments is that a state's
bar on unfair practices is not automatically preempted even if state restrictions vary
somewhat. On the other hand, states cannot mandate additional disclosures in advertis-
ing since inconsistent regulations in this area have the greatest potential for increasing
the costs to manufacturers. In contrast, certain restrictions, such as the location regula-
tions in Penn Advertising, the bar on cartoon characters proposed in Mangini, and
regulations of local promotions, clearly do not raise the specter of a multiple disclosure
151. See, e.g., the discussion in the RJR Reply Brief, supra note 89, at 13-14.
152. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (conflicting truck
length standards); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (conflicting standards for
truck mudguard flaps); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (conflicting standards for
railroad car lengths).
153. See, e.g., Toy Mfrs. of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 806 F. Supp. 336 (D. Conn. 1992) affd,
986 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding a state-mandated safety label). "A nondiscriminatory state
statute will be invalidated under the Commerce Clause only if it is impossible to comply with it and
other regulations." Id. at 348.
154. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 529.
155. This has been the traditional position of the Federal Trade Commission in evaluating the
deceptiveness of advertising. See, e.g., Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir.
1963); American Home Products Corp. v. F.T.C., 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1983).
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requirements in advertising. While there might be some conflicts among the states,
these are probably no greater than those that arise under acknowledged "general" du-
ties - such as the prohibition on deception. In each case, the court must consider the
degree to which there is a potential for imposing significant costs on advertisers, along
with the other factors already discussed.
V. APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
As discussed earlier, First Amendment analysis of commercial speech asks four
questions: 1) does the speech qualify for Constitutional protection at all? 2) is the
state's goal in restricting the speech a substantial interest? 3) does the restriction di-
rectly further that interest? and 4) is there a reasonable "fit" between the policy and
the State's goal? This part applies this analysis to a state or local restriction based on
the goal of protecting minors from advertising that promotes illegal purchases.
A. Does the Speech Qualify for Constitutional Protection?
Central Hudson provides that commercial speech warrants no Constitutional
protection if it is deceptive or if it promotes illegal activities."" A court might con-
clude that cigarette advertising targeting minors does not concern legal activities and
is, therefore, entitled to no constitutional protection. If it could be established that the
advertising reached exclusively minors, for example, a court might conclude that the
speech warranted no constitutional protection at all.157 However, perhaps because the
advertising almost always reaches adults too, courts have assumed that Central Hudson
applies.' 5
B. Is the State's Interest Substantial?
This prong of Central Hudson has typically been easy to meet. In Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co.,"' the Supreme Court concluded with little discussion that the
government's interest in reducing "strength wars" by beer brewers was substantial."W
In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, the Supreme
Court found that reducing the public's demand for gambling was a substantial inter-
est. " ' Perhaps the most relaxed application of the standard came in Florida Bar v.
Went for It, Inc., where the Supreme Court found that protecting the "flagging reputa-
156. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
157. See, e.g., Bystom v. Fridley High School, 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987). This case involved a
challenge to a restriction on the content of a student newspaper. One of the restrictions barred adver-
tisements of "any product or service not permitted to minors law." Id. at 755. Since the newspaper
reached almost exclusively minors, the court concluded that such advertisements would necessarily
promote illegal purchases and, therefore, found the restriction was permissible. Id. at 753.
158. See Penn Advertising, 862 F. Supp. at 1406 (indicating that the parties agreed that the "ad-
vertising in question is neither unlawful nor misleading").
159. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
160. Id. at 1590. On the other hand, the Court found that the "(Federal Government's] interest in
preserving state authority is not sufficiently substantial to meet the requirements of Central Hudson.
Even if the Federal Government possessed broad authority to facilitate state powers, in this case the
Government has offered nothing that suggests that States are in need of federal assistance." Id. at
1591.
161. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986).
The Court's comments in Coors Brewing Co. suggest that, as in Posadas, any good faith claim by the
government that it hopes to protect the health, safety and welfare of its citizens satisfies the substantial
interest requirement. See Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 1590.
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tions of Florida lawyers" was a substantial interest12
The courts that have considered the issue have easily concluded that preventing
minors from purchasing illegal products is a substantial interest.' The district court
in Penn Advertising found that reducing the illegal purchase and consumption of ciga-
rettes by minors was a substantial interest.' The Fourth Circuit, characterizing the
goal as promoting "compliance with the state prohibition of the sale of cigarettes to
minors," agreed." For this purpose, it appears there is little significance in whether
the interest is stated as protecting minors from purchasing illegal products, promoting
compliance with a state bar on the purchase of cigarettes, or simply protecting minors.
The formulation of the interest, of course, must be consistent with the formulation of
the interest for purposes of preemption analysis.
C. Does the Restriction Directly Further the Governmental Interest?
The most difficult prong of Central Hudson is the requirement that the State
show the restriction "advances the [governmental] interests in a direct and material
way . . . ."" The point of this requirement is sensible enough - speech should not
be restricted unless the state's policy actually accomplishes something significant. On
the other hand, if the burden on the state is unrealistically high, a state will rarely be
able to justify its policy. As a practical matter, commercial speech would have almost
absolute constitutional protection despite the Court's statements that commercial speech
receives intermediate scrutiny." Thus, the way this prong of Central Hudson is ap-
plied is critical to the fate of state policies regulating commercial speech.
The Supreme Court has not been particularly clear or consistent in stating how
the lower courts are to go about reviewing evidence of effectiveness. Several key
questions remain open: 1) to what degree does a reviewing court assess the validity of
the empirical evidence considered by the state when the restriction was adopted; 2) to
what extent can the State rely on "common sense" propositions about human behavior,
for example, the notion that advertising increases consumption by those who see it, or,
more specifically, advertising which children tend to remember has a significant effect
on their behavior; and 3) how does a court weigh conflicting evidence, e.g., testimony
and studies presented by the state versus similar evidence presented by the industry.
In the ideal case, a state would have conducted a study showing that a certain
162. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376. The Court also made clear that the state may assert more
than one interest, and this aspect of Central Hudson will be satisfied if one of the interests is substan-
tial. Id. at n.l.
163. In Mangini, neither the court of appeals, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), nor the
California Supreme Court, 875 P.2d 73, 76 (Cal. 1994), dealt with the merits of the First Amendment
claims. The court of appeals, in explaining that factual issues were implicated in the First Amendment
claim, commented: "(W]hether there is a substantial governmental interest in restriction depends on the
link between the Old Joe Camel advertisements and the consumption of cigarettes by minors. Thus,
resolution of the First Amendment issue must await the development of a factual record." (footnote
omitted) Mangini, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d at 240. Although the court's comment was addressed to whether the
interest is substantial, what the court probably had in mind was really another prong of Central Hud-
son - whether the restriction directly furthers the governmental interest.
164. Penn Advertising, 862 F. Supp. at 1406.
165. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1325 ("In the context of the current public concern over the
dangers of cigarette consumption by minors, there can be little opposition to the assertion that the
City's objective in reducing cigarette consumption by minors constitutes a substantial public interest.").
166. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771.
167. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 23:1
Cigarette Advertising
restriction on commercial speech has advanced a policy goal. Such a study would be
"backward-looking," that is, it would be based on actual experience after the restriction
was put into place. Often, however, there is no significant evidence of actual effects.
Judicial review occurs before there is much experience with a policy, or evidence of
effectiveness is difficult to obtain. Proof must then consist of evidence that similar
policies in other states have proven effective or that common sense presumptions about
human behavior mean that the policy will have some effect in the future. Actual evi-
dence of past effects is probably rare."'
In a case where the state restricts cigarette advertising affecting minors, the
state's ultimate goal is to reduce minors' purchase of cigarettes. Since all states restrict
sales of cigarettes to minors, the point of the advertising restriction is to make these
already-existing bans more effective. 69 It certainly should be sufficient for the state
to show that a certain advertising practice has increased unlawful purchases by minors.
It could then be assumed that barring or restricting the practice would reduce con-
sumption. In practice, however, direct proof of causation is difficult to obtain.
Evidence about the effect of advertising on the behavior of minors consists of
studies that attempt to directly link advertising and smoking, and those that attempt to
establish the link more indirectly. 7° A full description of this research is beyond the
scope of this article. However, there is clearly substantial evidence that at least some
advertising practices promote purchases by minors.' Are such studies sufficient to
uphold restrictions? In large part, the answer depends upon how the Court decides to
impose this prong of Central Hudson.
Some Justices, particularly Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, have
advocated a less demanding burden in commercial speech cases. For example, in
Posadas," written by then-Justice Rehnquist, the Court was willing to assume that
168. In many cases where the Court has upheld a restriction, the states have not presented actual
evidence of past effects. Sometimes the Court has relied on the "common sense" assumption that ad-
vertising increases consumption. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. 418, 428
(1993); Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344; see also infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text. Sometimes the
Court has concluded it is sufficient for the state to present evidence that there is a problem without
showing that the policy will actually help solve it. See, e.g., Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2378 (accept-
ing anecdotal survey of editorials as basis for concluding that a bar on attorney's solicitation will im-
prove the reputation of Florida attorneys in the future).
169. All fifty states ban sales of cigarettes to minors. See STATE TOBACCO CONTROL HIGH-
LIGHTS 1996, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Center for Disease Control 10-110 (1996).
Section 1926 of the Public Health Service Act requires states to enact legislation restricting the sale
and distribution of tobacco products to minors as a condition of receiving federal substance abuse
prevention and treatment block grant funds. This section also requires states to enforce these laws in a
"manner that can reasonably be expected to reduce the extent to which tobacco products are available
to individuals under the age of 18." 42 U.S.C. 300x-26 (1993). Section 897.14 of the recently issued
FDA rule also prohibits sales to persons under 18. See FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,616.
170. For example, some researchers have studied the frequency with which minors recall advertising
messages. See Appendix I.
171. A list of recent studies of the relationship between advertising and smoking is included as
Appendix I. There are also some studies of consumption patterns outside the United States in response
to bans on advertising by various countries. Two surveys of the studies on consumption patterns out-
side the United States are Smith, The Effect of Advertising on Juvenile Smoking Behavior, 9 INT'L J.
ADVERTISING 57 (Winter 1990) and Michael J. Stewart, The Effect on Tobacco. Consumption of Adver-
tising Bans in OECD Countries, 12 INTL J. ADVERTISING 155 (1993). Some of the data regarding
consumption outside the United States do not show a link between increased advertising and consump-
tion. The FDA proceeding regarding its rule regulating marketing of cigarettes has produced an exten-
sive administrative record, which is available to the public. See FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,396.
172. Posadas, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
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advertising increases consumption as a general proposition."' This approach signifi-
cantly reduces the state's burden in litigation since empirical evidence of reduced con-
sumption need not be submitted 74 In Florida Bar, written by Justice O'Connor, the
Court upheld an attorney-solicitation rule based on a modest showing by the state.75
The opinion suggests that state restrictions can be based on studies or surveys that do
not conform to high standards of social science research."' The state may rely on
experience from other areas of the country, anecdotal evidence, or simply common
sense.
i"
On the other hand, some Justices, particularly Justice Kennedy and Justice
Stevens, have argued for a more demanding evidentiary burden. The opinion by Justice
Kennedy in Edenfield v. Fane emphasized the need for solid evidence. 17  The
Stevens' opinion in Liquormart also emphasized the need for empirical evidence of
effectiveness." Justice Stevens was willing to assume that a bar on price advertising
will raise prices and that consumption will, therefore, be "somewhat lower."'8 ° How-
ever, he stated that Rhode Island had to show that the restriction "significantly" re-
duced consumption. 8' No doubt, these differences over the degree of proof required
173. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342. See also Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 434 ("Within the
bounds of the general protection provided by the Constitution to commercial speech, we allow room
for legislative judgments .... Here, as in Posadas de Puerto Rico, the Government obviously legis-
lated on the premise that the advertising of gambling serves to increase the demand for the advertised
product .... Congress clearly was entitled to determine that broadcast of promotional advertising of
lotteries undermines North Carolina's policy against gambling.") (citations omitted); Central Hudson,
447 U.S. at 569 ("There is an immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity.
Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it believed that promotion would increase
its sales."); Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490, 501 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United
States Dep't of Agric., 14 F.3d 429, 439 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he Supreme Court assumes as a matter
of law that advertising increases consumption of the product or service being advertised .... ).
174. The link, then would be an example of a "legislative fact" - a proposition about human
behavior that is familiar but that does not lend itself to proof in the context of litigation. See, e.g.,
Fed. R. Evid. 201 advisory committee's note ("Legislative facts . . . are those which have relevance to
legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling
by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body . . . . [This view] renders inappropriate
any limitation in the form of indisputability, any formal requirement of notice . . . and any formal
requirement of findings at any level. It should, however, leave open the possibility of introducing
evidence through regular channels in appropriate situations.").
175. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2381.
176. In Florida Bar, the Court referred to a "106 page study." Id. at 2377. However, this study
appears to have been primarily a collection of newspaper editorials and anecdotal information. There
was a survey of the attitudes of Florida citizens, but it fell far short of accepted norms for social
science research. See supra notes 69-70.
177. See id. at 2378 ("[W]e have permitted litigants to justify speech restrictions by reference to
studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether . . . or even, in a case applying strict
scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and 'simple common sense' .
Nothing in Edenfield . . . requires more.") (citations omitted).
178. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71 ("[The state's burden] is not satisfied by mere speculation
or conjecture; rather a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restrictions will in fact alleviate them to a
material degree.") Justice Kennedy also dissented in Florida Bar, arguing that the state should have
presented more evidence. See supra note 70.
179. See 116 S. Ct. at 1509. The O'Connor opinion in Liquormart assumed for purposes of the
analysis that the state had met its burden in showing that the restriction was effective. Therefore, it
did not comment on the type of degree of proof needed to sustain the state's burden. See id at 1521.
180. Id. at 1509.
181. See id. ("We can agree that common sense supports the conclusion that a prohibition against
price advertising, like a collusive agreement among competitors to refrain from such advertising, will
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reflect deeper conflicts over the degree of protection to be afforded commercial
speech.
Disagreements on the Supreme Court spill over into arguments before the lower
courts. In Penn Advertising, the plaintiff made the argument that the Supreme Court in
Edenfield had increased the state's burden to show the effect of a restriction and now
requires that the link between advertising and increased consumption must be estab-
lished in each case."' The district court rejected this contention and concluded that
the link could be assumed."3 The court of appeals in Penn Advertising also appears
to have assumed that the causal link could be established without empirical proof.'
No doubt, the Stevens opinion in Liquormart will revive the argument that there
must be empirical proof of effects in evaluating restrictions aimed at minors. More-
over, opponents of restrictions will also argue that the state must now prove a signifi-
cant reduction in consumption." 5 However, Liquormart itself does not mandate these
requirements. In fact, Liquormart says very little about the unique nature of restrictions
on cigarette advertising that affects minors.
The first reason that Justice Stevens' discussion of the evidentiary burden may
not apply is that it represents the view of only four Justices. 6 No other Justice took
a position on the degree of empirical proof required to support a restriction.8 7 Sec-
tend to mitigate competition and maintain prices at a higher level than would prevail in a completely
free market. Despite the absence of proof on the point, we can even agree with the State's contention
that it is reasonable to assume that demand, and hence consumption throughout the market, is some-
what lower . . .However, without any findings of fact, or indeed any evidentiary support whatsoever,
we cannot agree with the assertion that the price advertising ban will significantly advance the State's
interest in promoting temperance.") (citations omitted).
182. Penn Advertising, 862 F. Supp. at 1407.
183. Id. at 1410 ("This Court holds that it remains appropriate in the wake of Edenfield to accept
the judicially-recognized proposition that advertising increases consumption. Furthermore, if advertising
increases consumption among the general population, it is also reasonable to accept the proposition that
advertising increases consumption among youths. If anything, this statement may be more applicable to
the youthful population than to the adult population due to the impressionable nature of youngsters.")
The district court relied particularly on Cal-Almond, 14 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1993). See Penn Advertis-
ing, 862 F. Supp. at 1410.
184. See Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1325. The court of appeals pointed to its own findings in a
related case involving a municipal restriction on alcohol advertising, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke,
63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995). In the case of the alcohol ordinance, the city had relied on numerous
studies to show the link between alcohol advertising and consumption by minors. These were clearly
helpful to the city in persuading the court of appeals to uphold the ordinance. Id. at 1325. The court
of appeals in Penn Advertising, however, did not rely on any evidence of the effect of cigarette adver-
tising, nor did it appear to conclude that the studies of the effect of alcohol advertising could be
extended to cigarette advertising. It simply assumed that the legislature's conclusion was reasonable.
"There is a logical nexus between the City's objective and the means it selected for achieving that
objective, and it is not necessary, in satisfying Central Hudson's third prong, to prove conclusively that
the correlation in fact exists, or that the steps undertaken will solve the problem. If that were required,
communities could never initiate even minor steps to address their problems, for they could never be
assured of the success of their efforts. The proper standard for approval must involve an assessment of
the reasonableness of the legislature's belief that the means it selected will advance its ends." Id.
(quoting Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1316).
185. Requiring a greater degree of proof that a state policy will reduce consumption is different
from requiring proof that a state policy will reduce consumption by a greater degree. Justice Stevens
seemed to say that the state's burden is to show the latter. See supra note 68. Thus, a modest eviden-
tiary showing that an advertising practice could effect a very large number of minors may be suffi-
cient.
186. Three other Justices joined Part V of the opinion, which discusses the evidence required to
justify a restriction - Justices Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg. Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1499.
187. Justice Thomas expressly declined to weigh the evidence in support of the state's policy. See
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ond, Justice Stevens stated that a particularly strong showing is required in the case of
complete restrictions on speech.' In contrast, local cigarette advertising restrictions
typically leave open alternative avenues for disseminating commercial messages to
adults such as magazines and newspapers." 8 Arguably, when ample alternatives are
available, Justice Stevens himself would endorse applying less demanding scrutiny.
In addition, the more demanding scrutiny in Liquormart was applied to a state
restriction aimed at withholding information from adult decision-makers." 9 Both the
Stevens and Thomas opinions were clearly concerned about paternalism - attempts by
the state to discourage lawful behavior by adults.'9' This concern about paternalism
also animated Justice Stevens' opposition to a special rule for lawful "vice"
activity."9e A different analysis should apply when the state attempts to change the
behavior of minors. Lawful behavior by adults, which might simply be considered
"vices," can be unlawful when practiced by minors. The states then face the difficult
dilemma of discouraging unlawful activity by one group while allowing speech about
the same activity to reach the group for which it is lawful. Greater deference to the
states is warranted when they attempt to strike this difficult balance."'
The Court has frequently recognized that minors are not prepared to evaluate
potentially harmful speech in the same way that adults can. As a result, speech that the
state cannot keep from adults can be kept from minors."9 In those cases, the First
Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1518.
188. See, e.g., id. at 1509 ("In evaluating the ban's effectiveness in advancing the State's interest,
we note that a commercial speech regulation 'may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or
remote support for the government's purpose.' mhe State bears the burden of showing not merely that
its regulation will advance its interest, but also that it will do so 'to a material degree.' The need for
the State to make such a showing is particularly great given the drastic nature of its chosen means -
the wholesale suppression of truthful, nonmisleading information.") (citations omitted); see also id. at
1506, 1507.
189. See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
190. Justice Stevens' examples of bans on advertising unrelated to consumer protection all involved
cases where the state was attempting to modify the purchasing decisions of adults. They included:
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 355 (1977) (ban on lawyer advertising); Carey v. Popula-
tion Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700 (1977) (a ban on contraceptive advertising); Linmark Assocs., Inc.
v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92-94 (1977) (a ban on "For Sale" signs in neighborhoods undergoing
racial change); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council; Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (ban on prescription drug price advertising); and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 (1975)
(ban on abortion advertising). See Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1505, n.8.
191. See, e.g., id. at 1511 ("[I]n keeping with our prior holdings, we conclude that a state legisla-
ture does not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic
purposes ....") (opinion of Justice Stevens); See also id. at 1518 ("I do not join the principal
opinion's application of the Central Hudson balancing test because I do not believe that such a test
should be applied to a restriction of 'commercial' speech, at least when, as here, the asserted interest
is one that is to be achieved through keeping would-be recipients of the speech in the dark.") (foot-
note omitted) (opinion of Justice Thomas).
192. See id. at 1513 ("Almost any product that poses some threat to the protection afforded by the
First Amendment would be difficult, if not impossible to define . . ..Such characterization ... is
anomalous when applied to products such as alcoholic beverages, lottery tickets, or playing cards, that
may be lawfully purchased on the open market.").
193. The Central Hudson formulation provides that commercial speech must "concern lawful ac-
tivity" for it to receive any constitutional protection. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. See also Vir-
ginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772-73 (stating that there is no First Amendment protection for
speech that proposes an illegal transaction). The Court has not yet had to analyze a restriction on
speech that promotes both lawful and unlawful transactions.
194. The Court has consistently applied a different standard in evaluating policies aimed at prevent-
ing harmful speech from reaching minors. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consor-
tium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2386 (1996) (government has a compelling interest in protecting
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Amendment concern is not about paternalism at all, but about minimizing the degree to
which restrictions unnecessarily prevent speech from reaching adults. 95
A final question is whether a court is to somehow weigh the evidence for and
against the effectiveness of a restriction, or whether the court need only determine if
the state has a significant body of evidence supporting its policy.96 The latter ap-
proach would be similar to the "substantial evidence" standard applied in judicial re-
view of administrative decisions."9 The Court has historically insisted on the need
for an independent review of the record in cases where speech restrictions are at is-
sue.'98 However, this tradition evolved in the context of highly politicized cases
where there was ample reason to distrust the fact-finding process.'
Commercial speech restrictions are inherently less likely to be attempts to op-
press an ideological minority or to squelch controversial points of view. Consequently,
there is less justification for courts to engage in a de novo review of the factual find-
ings of lower courts or legislative bodies. Thus, a substantial evidence scope of review
is more consistent with the intermediate scrutiny given to restrictions on commercial
speech.' Moreover, it is a more realistic burden to place on local legislative bodies,
which must make policy decisions in the real-life context of the political process. In
fact, that is the approach the Court seems to use."' In short, the question should be
whether the policy-making body has substantial evidence that its policy will discourage
illegal purchases, not whether a preponderance of the evidence shows such an effect.
In summary, there are several reasons to conclude that Liquormart does not
modify the traditional Central Hudson analysis as applied to restrictions on cigarette
advertising that affects minors. In particular, states should be able to rely on the com-
mon sense presumption that advertising promotes consumption.' Even if a tradi-
tional analysis of Central Hudson is applied to these kinds of restrictions, however,
proof of the effect of advertising restrictions is complicated by a dispute about the
audience itself. In cases where the Supreme Court was willing to accept a presumption
about effects (e.g., Posadas and Edge Broadcasting), the advertising was concededly
children from exposure to patently offensive sexually related material); Sable Communications of Cali-
fornia, Inc., v. FCC 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (government may act to prevent indecent messages
from reaching minors); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-41 (1968) (state may prohibit sale
of material to minors even though it is not obscene). On remand, the court of appeals emphasized this
point in upholding ordinances regulating alcohol and cigarette advertising in order to protect minors.
See Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cit. 1996).
195. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecom Consortium, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 2391-92 (even though
protection of minors is a compelling interest, strict scrutiny requires the government to adopt the least
restrictive alternative).
196. The latter position seems to have been the view of the court of appeals in Penn Advertising.
See supra note 184.
197. See, e.g., Finzer v. Berry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
198. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States. 466 U.S. 485, 505-08 (1984).
199. For example, the Court emphasized the need for an independent review of the record in a
number of cases where civil rights demonstrators had been arrested for threatening a breach of the
peace. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 546-52 (1965). The core concern is that the fact finder may not be neutral in assessing the ac-
tions of controversial minorities. See Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 570; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
200. The Court has offered a number of reasons why commercial speech should be subject to less
demanding scrutiny than restrictions on non-commercial speech. See supra note 31.
201. See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 168, 173-74 and accompanying text.
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aimed at adults, and the state's concern was about the effect on adults. 3 The adver-
tisers in those cases were hard-pressed to claim that such advertising had no effect
since they were willing to spend substantial sums for it.2' A claim that certain ciga-
rette advertising affects minors will inevitably be more controversial. The tobacco
industry will surely argue that the advertising is aimed only at adults and that its exclu-
sive effect (if any) is on them. Thus, lower courts may be hesitant to accept a pre-
sumption that an advertising restriction will reduce illegal purchases by minors in the
absence of any proof that a particular campaign practice is likely to affect minors.'
Therefore, a state or city should be prepared to present some evidence of the likely
effect on minors, even if it relies on inferences and even if it is based on experience in
other localities.
D. Is there a Reasonable Fit Between the State's Goal and the Means
Chosen to Achieve It?
The last prong of Central Hudson concerns the degree to which the restriction is
"tailored" to the State's goal. As discussed earlier, the State need not carry the very
demanding burden that there is no less restrictive alternative. Instead, the fit needs only
to be reasonable. Thus, this "tailoring" standard is less demanding than the one applied
to non-commercial speech. °"
The Court asks two kinds of questions in applying this "reasonable fit" require-
ment. First, does the state's policy restrict the least amount of speech possible while
still accomplishing its goal? In the case of a restriction intended to prevent advertising
that presents products to minors, for example, the question would be whether the re-
striction unnecessarily restricts speech that affects only adults. The second question is
related, but it raises quite different issues: are there alternative policies that can ac-
complish the state's goal as effectively without restricting speech at all? For example,
if the state's goal is to reduce consumption, would alternative approaches such as regu-
lating prices or banning a product entirely be just as effective?
E. Reasonable Fit and the Preemption Analysis
The "reasonable fit" analysis is related to the preemption inquiry about the scope
of a restriction, but there are some important differences. First, the point of the pre-
emption inquiry about scope is to determine the true basis of the state's policy. In that
context, the problem of lack of fit is that it undermines the State's asserted rationale.
203. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 560; Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341; Edge Broadcasting, 509
U.S. at 429.
204. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 567 ("Most businesses - even regulated monopolies - are
unlikely to underwrite promotional advertising that is of no interest or use to consumers.").
205. On the other hand, the district court in Penn Advertising thought the presumption was even
stronger in the case of children. See supra note 183.
206. See Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1521 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra notes 80-82
and accompanying text. The less demanding "reasonable fit" requirement was originally stated in Board
of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1989). A second difference involves the application of the
overbreadth doctrine to restrictions that are overly broad on their face. In non-commercial speech cases,
the Court will strike down an overly broad restriction even though the speech to which it is applied
can constitutionally be prohibited. See e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972). Howev-
er, this "strong medicine" is not applied to commercial speech on the grounds that commercial speech
is less "susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation." See Bates, 433 U.S. at 380-81.
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The point of the First Amendment inquiry about scope is ordinarily whether the re-
striction goes too far in restricting speech. In that context, the problem of lack of fit is
that some speech is unnecessarily restricted in light of the state's goal.
Several implications follow from these differences. For example, an exceedingly
broad restriction on speech (e.g., a ban on all outdoor advertising within a city) would
survive preemption analysis because it would be consistent with a non-health goal,
such as the preservation of an aesthetically pleasing environment or improving traffic
safety.2' The point of the preemption inquiry is not how narrow or how broad the
restriction is, but whether it is consistent with a non-health goal. On the other hand,'
such a restriction might be viewed as overly broad for purposes of First Amendment
analysis because it goes too far in restricting speech.' In determining whether re-
strictions are overly broad, First Amendment cases have traditionally considered
whether there are still other channels for conveying the same message.' The exis-
tence of other channels has no particular relevance in the preemption inquiry.
A second difference is that the preemption inquiry does not require the State to
show that there are less restrictive alternatives. In fact, it is not obvious what "less
restrictive" would mean in the preemption context, since the question is simply wheth-
er the restriction is based on a non-health goal. First Amendment analysis, however,
does require at least some consideration of less restrictive alternatives since there is
always an underlying value at stake - freedom of speech.
F. Unreasonably Broad Restrictions
The primary concern about a commercial speech regulation should be whether it
unnecessarily restricts too much speech. Thus, the more a restriction is targeted to a
particular type of advertising practice, the less should be the concern that the restric-
tion is unreasonably broad. Neither court in Mangini dealt with the merits of the First
Amendment issues.21 Thus, we do not yet have a court opinion specifically analyz-
ing the problem of overbreadth raised by a restriction on the use of a cartoon charac-
ter. Nevertheless, it seems clear that such a narrow restriction should not raise over-
breadth concerns. First, the restriction appears narrowly tailored to accomplish the goal
of protecting minors. Second, advertisers are left with ample alternative channels to
207. Both of these interests were advanced by the City of San Diego in support of its ordinance
banning certain types of outdoor advertising. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08.
208. For example, some small outdoor signs might be viewed as presenting no risk to aesthetics or
safety and, therefore, a ban on all outdoor advertising of whatever kind might be too broad. See, e.g.,
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 528-30 (Brennan, J., concurring). Seven Justices were prepared to conclude
that San Diego could ban all offsite commercial billboard advertising. See id. at 512-17 (White, J., op.
of the Court, joined by Stewart, J., Marshall, J., and Powell, J.); Id. at 555 (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part); id. at 555-69 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); and id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Dis-
covery Network, 507 U.S. at 444 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (summarizing the views of various Justices in
Metromedia). However, the ordinance was struck down in part because it barred certain non-commer-
cial messages when commercial messages were allowed in the same location. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at
512-15.
209. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2468 n.8
(1995); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (1994); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61 (1981). On the other hand, the Court has said that the existence of alternative channels
will not save a restriction on commercial speech, if there is no valid justification for treating it differ-
ently from other speech. This is one point of Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 427. See also Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 79-80 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
210. See supra note 136.
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convey their message. A ban on a particular image in advertising leaves all other types
and locations of advertising media open to the advertiser. In fact, it is hard to believe
that such a restriction significantly burdens a manufacturer's ability to convey its mes-
sage unless the message is aimed at children.
A ban on billboard advertising of cigarettes presents a more difficult case, since
manufacturers are precluded from at least one major channel of advertising. The dis-
trict court in Penn Advertising, however, concluded that a bar on certain types of bill-
board advertising was not overly broad.211 First, the court was persuaded that the city
had done a reasonable job of crafting the ordinance to restrict advertising that would
reach minors.212 In fact, billboard advertising was viewed as having a particularly
significant effect on minors."3 Second, there were ample alternative channels avail-
able for advertisers to reach their adult audience. In addition to billboards in commer-
cial and some residential areas, tobacco manufacturers had access to newspapers, mag-
azines, signs inside stores which sell cigarettes, storefronts of businesses that sell ciga-
rettes, and the inside and outside of busses.2"" The court of appeals agreed with the
reasoning of the district court.215
G. Underinclusive Restrictions
The plaintiff in Penn Advertising also argued that the ordinance was
underinclusive, that is, in some respects it did not go far enough. In particular, the
plaintiff pointed to the fact that the ordinance did not cover other forms of similar
advertising, such as newspapers and magazines.2 6 For example, the ordinance ex-
empted signs outside retail stores selling cigarettes though it barred other outdoor
signs. An attack based on underinclusiveness is conceptually different from one based
on overbreadth since the claim is that it restricts too little speech, not too much.
The Supreme Court has made clear that underinclusiveness is not fatal under
rational basis review. The traditional rationale is that the State need not address the
211. The ordinance reviewed in Penn Advertising barred advertising in residential areas of Balti-
more. Outdoor signs were permitted outside retail stores that sold cigarettes. Penn Advertising, 862 F.
Supp. at 1414.
212. "The City has limited the ban on cigarette advertising to billboards in neighborhoods in which
children would typically be found such as the areas in which they live, attend school and church and
recreate. In those residential and business zones in which children would not normally be found, the
ordinance has no effect." Id. at 1414 (footnote omitted).
213. "inhere are legitimate justifications related to the city's substantial interest for distinguishing
between billboards and other types of mediums which the ordinance does not affect. The distinction
between permitted and prohibited forms of advertising rests on the effect that different mediums have
on adolescents." Id. at 1411. The court quoted with approval the comment by Judge Hargrove in the
related case dealing with alcohol advertising. ("[A] billboard is a constant fixture in a neighborhood. It
looms over children every day while they walk to school, and every time they play in their neighbor-
hood, thus forming an inescapable part of their daily life.") Id. (quoting Anheuser-Busch, 855 F. Supp.
at 822).
214. Penn Advertising, 862 F. Supp. at 1414.
215. "If there were some less restrictive means of screening outdoor advertising from minors, or of
reducing the area of billboard regulation in a manner that would have it focus more efficiently on
reaching minors, the City would have to consider those alternatives. But it is not an acceptable re-
sponse to the approach taken by the City of limiting advertising exposure to say that the City must
abandon altogether an approach that directly advances its goal. In the face of a problem as significant
as that which the City seeks to address, the City must be given some reasonable latitude." Penn Ad-
vertising, 63 F.3d at 1325-26 (quoting Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1316). See also Anheuser-Busch v.
Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 1996).
216. Penn Advertising, 862 F. Supp. at 1411.
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entire scope of a problem, if it wants to address part of it.2 17 It is not obvious that a
claim of underinclusiveness should be given any weight in First Amendment cases
either, since the core value to be protected - freedom of speech - is not threatened
when the law is underinclusive"' Nevertheless, the Court has sometimes struck
down a speech restriction based on what might loosely be described as underinclusive-
ness.
In Discovery Network, for example, the city barred the use of sidewalk
newsracks used to disseminate commercial handbills but did not ban newsracks dis-
seminating non-commercial newspapers." 9 The Court stated that it would reach the
same conclusion, even if it were assumed that the city could ban all newsracks on
public property.2' The Court overturned the ordinance because it concluded that
there was no legitimate justification for distinguishing between newsracks that con-
tained commercial speech and those that contained non-commercial speech. Newsracks
containing both types of speech caused the same problem the city claimed it was try-
ing to solve - protecting safety and aesthetics.22" '
An attack based on underinclusiveness is more directly related to the second
prong of Central Hudson - the requirement that the restriction directly advance the
government's interest. Underinclusiveness can appear to undermine the rationality of
the regulatory scheme or suggest that the scope of a regulation is so narrow that its
effect is de minimis. Thus, a court may conclude that the scheme has no significant
effect, that the government is actually trying to accomplish some other goal, or simply
that the government does not know what it is doing. In any case, the government has
failed to show that the restriction directly furthers a substantial interest. Similar reason-
ing appears in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., where the Court criticized the federal
regulatory scheme of barring alcohol content on beer labels on the ground that it did
not go further.' The Court seemed to believe that the narrowness of the restriction
showed that the government really had another goal in mind besides preventing
"strength wars," or that it did not believe that preventing strength wars was a signifi-
cant goal in the first place."m
If the state can show that there is a legitimate justification for limiting the reach
of a restriction, the underinclusiveness claim should be rejected. In Discovery Network,
217. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
218. See, for example, the Court's comment in Edge Broadcasting, regarding a Federal statute that
prevented a radio station in Virginia from broadcasting lottery advertising that reached North Carolina,
a state that barred gambling. "Nor do we require that the Government make progress on every front
before it can make progress on any front. If there is an immediate connection between advertising and
demand, and the federal regulation decreases advertising, it stands to reason that the policy of decreas-
ing demand for gambling is correspondingly advanced. Accordingly, the Government may be said to
advance its purpose by substantially reducing lottery advertising, even where it is not wholly eradicat-
ed." Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 434.
219. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 413-14.
220. Id. at 427-28.
221. See id. at 426 ("[T]he city's primary concern . . . is with the aggregate number of newsracks
on its streets. On that score, however, all newsracks, regardless of whether they contain commercial or
noncommercial publications, are equally at fault.").
222. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
223. See id. at 1592-93 ("If combatting strength wars were the goal, we would assume that Con-
gress would regulate disclosure of alcohol content for the strongest beverages as well as for the weak-
est ones . . . .One would [also] think that if the Government sought to suppress strength wars by
prohibiting numerical disclosures of alcohol content, it also would preclude brewers from indicating
higher alcohol beverages by using descriptive terms.").
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the city claimed that the distinction was based on the fact that commercial speech was
entitled to less constitutional protection than non-commercial speech."4 A majority of
the Court viewed a different level of constitutional protection as inadequate to uphold
the distinction.2" In contrast, in Penn Advertising there were two justifications for the
limitations on the scope of the ordinance: the commercial interest of businesses in
communicating location and the lower likelihood that these kinds of signs would affect
children. 6 There is ample precedent for making these kinds of distinctions in adver-
tising regulation. In particular, a closer analogy to this type of distinction is the ban on
certain types of offsite billboards reviewed in Metromedia.' The opinion of the
Court expressly stated that a distinction between offsite and onsite advertising could be
justified.22
The majority was probably wrong in Discovery Network in recognizing an
underinclusiveness claim when there was a basis offered for the city's classification
scheme. In fact, the district court in Penn Advertising suggested that the state does
need to justify a decision to regulate only certain types of speech. In the view of the
district court, it is enough to say that the state "need not make progress on all fronts
before attempting to make progress on any."' While this view may be the most
sensible one, a majority of the Supreme Court seems prepared to insist that the state
justify both the breadth and narrowness of its regulation. Ordinarily, there will be a
224. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 415.
225. Id. at 426-27. It is not obvious why the different levels of constitutional protection are insuffi-
cient to justify such a distinction. In Discovery Network, the Court relied on Bolger, 463 U.S. 60
(1983), to conclude that the lower level of protection for commercial speech would not justify different
treatment by the government. Id. at 427. However, the Court in Bolger simply found that there was
no substantial state interest in preventing persons from being offended who received unsolicited contra-
ceptive advertising. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72. The distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech was beside the point since the restriction would fail under the test for commercial or non-com-
mercial speech. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416, n.11.
226. "The City seeks to prevent the exposure of minors to advertisements that will increase their
demand for cigarettes. They do not seek to hide the locations of establishments that sell cigarettes,
thereby placing obstacles in the way of adult smokers seeking to purchase cigarettes and harming local
businesses .. . .Ordinance 307 accomplishes this while not unnecessarily interfering with local busi-
nesses or adult smokers by prohibiting the smaller on-site advertisements that likely have less influence
on youngsters and serve a commercial and public interest by informing adult smokers of where ciga-
rettes may be purchased." Penn Advertising, 862 F. Supp. at 1413.
227. Metromedia, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
228. Id. at 511-12 ("It is ...argued that the city denigrates its interest in traffic safety and beau-
ty and defeats its own case by permitting onsite advertising and other specified signs . . . . (Tihis
argument has been rejected, at least implicitly, in all of the cases sustaining the distinction between
offsite and onsite commercial advertising . . . . [Whether onsite advertising is permitted or not, the
prohibition of offsite advertising is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic safety and esthet-
ics. This is not altered by the fact that the ordinance is underinclusive because it permits onsite adver-
tising. Second, the city may believe that offsite advertising, with is [sic] periodically changing content,
presents a more acute problem than does onsite advertising . . . Third, San Diego has obviously cho-
sen to value one kind of commercial speech-onsite advertising-more than another kind of commer-
cial speech-offsite advertising.") Id. at 510-12 (citations omitted). See also the Court's discussion of
Metromedia in Discovery Network ("[T]he offsite-onsite distinction involved disparate treatment of two
types of commercial speech. Only the onsite signs served both the commercial and public interest in
guiding potential visitors to their intended destinations ... ") Discovery Network 507 U.S. at 425
n.20. See also City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810-11 (1984)
(city's bar on posting of signs on public property upheld even though it did not extend to private
property); Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 751 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding a ban on intra-
state liquor advertising even though interstate advertising allowed).
229. Penn Advertising, 862 F. Supp. at 1413.
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justification for excluding certain categories of advertising based on the relative impor-
tance to adults and to affected business, and conversely, the relatively lesser impact on
minors.
H. Non-speech Restricting Alternatives
The most difficult hurdle for states in justifying advertising restrictions may be
the requirement that the state pursue policy alternatives that do not restrict speech at
all. Unfortunately, the Court has been willing to give credence to alternatives casually
suggested by parties during litigation. For example, in Coors Brewing Co., the Court
was willing to accept direct price regulation as a credible alternative to limitations on
content labeling in order to prevent strength wars.2 Not a single word was said
about the administrative difficulties of this approach.
In Liquormart, both the Stevens and O'Connor opinions required the state to
pursue non-speech restricting approaches to reducing alcohol consumption, including
price or consumption regulation.23' No attention was paid to the formidable - one
might even say insurmountable - problems a state would face in monitoring beer pur-
chases by millions of persons. As Justice Thomas commented, these non-speech re-
stricting alternatives can be more restrictive than a regulation of speech.232 The will-
ingness of the Court to seize upon non-speech alternatives with little or no analysis
represents a serious flaw in its current approach to commercial speech cases. An irony
in some of the Court's recent commercial speech cases has been the tendency to im-
pose a heavy evidentiary burden on the state while imposing no evidentiary burden on
those who suggest alternatives. Granting automatic plausibility to non-speech restrict-
ing alternatives can effectively preclude any alternative that involves restricting
speech.233
A second flaw in the requirement that the state must choose a non-speech re-
stricting alternative is that it may foreclose the only politically acceptable approach to
a serious social problem. In the case of restrictions on cigarette advertising, for exam-
ple, a social policy of reducing consumption by limiting advertising attracts consider-
able political support because it imposes costs on only a small number of groups com-
pared to the groups that may benefit. The tobacco industry and persons who want
access to unrestricted advertising lose out while parents, smoking opponents, and teen-
agers benefit. In contrast, banning cigarettes entirely or regulation of consumption,
would provoke opposition by a much greater array of groups. Committed users would
incur substantial costs, along with the costs to industry, whose very existence would be
230. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
232. See Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1519.
233. Justice Thomas took the position in Liquormart that a state can never justify barring truthful
advertising to reduce consumption. See id. at 1518-19. He concluded that the practical effect of the
Stevens and O'Connor opinions was apparently the same as his proposed rule of per se illegitimacy.
See id. at 1519 ("[The Stevens and O'Connor opinions] would appear to commit the courts to striking
down restrictions on speech whenever a direct regulation (i.e., a regulation involving no restriction on
speech regarding lawful activity at all) would be an equally effective method of dampening demand by
legal users. But it would seem that directly banning a product (or rationing it, taxing it, controlling is
price, or otherwise restricting its sale in specific ways) would virtually always be at least as effective
in discouraging consumption as merely restricting advertising regarding the product would be, and thus
virtually all restrictions with such a purpose would fail the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.")
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threatened. In addition, substantial costs would be imposed on all taxpayers because of
the massive administrative burden of implementing such a policy. In large part for
these reasons, there is no significant political support for banning the sale of cigarettes.
A tax increase provokes opposition by committed users and the industry. Moreover,
the opposition "spills over" to include persons who may be non-smokers because of a
generalized opposition to higher taxes.2"
In short, restrictions on advertising will often represent a natural political equilib-
rium, which discourages consumption by occasional, uncommitted smokers, while
posing less threat to the industry and preserving freedom of choice for habitual smok-
ers.235 Applying the First Amendment in a way that drastically constrains the choices
the public can make in a very real sense undermines a broader First Amendment value
- democratic decision-making itself.
The Court should reconsider its casual acceptance of non-speech restricting alter-
natives. At the very least, there should be some burden on the parties suggesting alter-
natives to show that they will be equally effective. Moreover, the Court should consid-
er the administrative costs of implementing such alternatives along with the burden on
individuals. However, the willingness of the Court to seize upon these alternatives with
no real evidentiary showing suggests that states should be prepared to show why alter-
natives that do not restrict speech are inadequate.
Even if the Court continues to require non-speech restricting alternatives, the
requirement should have little applicability to restrictions on advertising that affect
minors. These restrictions supplement already-existing bans on purchases by mi-
nors.236 In fact, states and cities only adopt advertising restrictions because prohibi-
tions on sales are not completely successful. Thus, these are not situations where the
states have failed to attempt non-speech restrictive alternatives. The most intrusive
approach of all - a flat ban on sales - has proven only partly effective. Advertising
restrictions are necessary to make the states' other approaches work better.
VI. CONCLUSION
States and localities do have some authority to regulate cigarette advertising,
though the precise parameters of this authority must await further development by the
courts. The 1969 Act, as interpreted by Cipollone, is not easy to apply. As is often the
case, political compromises in Congress have left a regulatory framework that is nei-
ther a model of clarity nor even particularly sensible. Nevertheless, until the political
equilibrium in Congress changes, or FDA actions make much of the preceding discus-
sion unnecessary, the Cipollone preemption framework will remain the principle hurdle
to state and local law, at least regarding limitations of federal law. First Amendment
considerations also pose a challenge to local regulation, but a well-crafted law accom-
panied by evidentiary support has a good chance of overcoming this difficulty.
The preceding discussion suggests that the kinds of laws most likely to survive
the twin hurdles of preemption and First Amendment analysis fall into two categories:
234. See, e.g., Andrea Neal, Low Taxes, High Death Rates for Smokers, INDLANAPots STAR, Feb.
1, 1996, at A-8 (commenting that defeat of a proposal to raise cigarette excise taxes was based on the
broader dislike of tax hikes).
235. See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, Clinton Set to Approve Curbs on Cigarette Sale to Youths, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 22, 1996, at A-3 (discussing polls that show widespread support for restrictions on adver-
tising that may encourage minors to smoke).
236. See supra note 169.
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1) flat prohibitions on particular advertising practices, including those involving the
content of advertising, as long as they do not mandate affirmative disclosures; and 2)
restrictions on the location and types of advertising that already must be tailored to
local markets, such as the use of billboards or promotional handouts. In all cases,
Cipollone requires that the state or local restriction must be grounded on a different
basis than protecting minors from the dangerous health effects of smoking. At the
same time, the restrictions should be reasonably tailored to go only as far as necessary
to advance this goal. States should assemble evidence supporting the likely effective-
ness at the time of enactment and be prepared to make a strong evidentiary case for
their policy when it is challenged. These latter requirements follow from Central Hud-
son and the Court's analysis of restrictions on commercial speech.
The industry has argued that even a restriction narrowly tailored to prevent mi-
nors from making illegal purchases is preempted since the only reason to protect mi-
nors is to protect their health. This may prove to be the most vulnerable part of the
industry's position. Courts are unlikely to accept the bald proposition that states are
helpless to prevent even the most blatant commercial attempts to encourage children to
buy products that the state has declared are illegal. There is a particular irony, in fact,
in the tobacco industry, which has historically denied the dangerous health effects of
its products, claiming that the only reason a state would regulate cigarette advertising
is a concern about death and disease.
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APPENDIX I: RECENT STUDIES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CIGARETTE ADVERTISING AND SMOKING BY MINORS
Pierce, et al., Influence of Tobacco Marketing and Exposure to Smokers on Ado-
lescent Susceptibility to Smoking, 87 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 538 (1995) (children with
high susceptibility to cigarette advertising are more likely to start smoking).
Changes in the Cigarette Brand Preferences of Adolescent Smokers - United
States, 1989-1993, 11 JAMA 843 (1994) (brands most commonly purchased by teenag-
ers corresponded to most heavily advertised brands).
Pierce, et al., Smoking Initiation by Adolescent Girls, 1944 Through 1988: An
Association With Targeted Advertising, 8 JAMA 608 (1994) (growth in initiation rates
of smoking among teenage girls coincided with introduction of advertising targeting
female smokers).
Botvin, et al., Smoking Behavior of Adolescents Exposed to Cigarette Advertis-
ing, 108 PuB. HEALTH REP. 217 (1993) (adolescent smokers with high exposure to
advertising are more likely to be smokers).
Pierce, et al., Does Tobacco Advertising Target Young People To Start Smoking?
Evidence From California, 266 JAMA 3154 (1991) (perception of advertising higher
among young smokers; changes in market-share resulting from advertising occur main-
ly among younger smokers).
DiFranza, et al., R.J.R. Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel Cigarettes to
Children, 266 JAMA 3149 (1991) (Old Joe Camel cartoon figure more effective at
marketing cigarettes to children than to adults).
Fischer, et al., Brand Logo Recognition By Children Aged 3 to 6 Years: Mickey
Mouse and Old Joe the Camel, 266 JAMA 3145 (1991) (Old Joe Camel figure as well
recognized by children as Mickey Mouse).
Klitzner, et al., Cigarette Advertising and Adolescent Experimentation With
Smoking, 86 BRIT. J. ADDICTION 287 (1991) (adolescents who experimented with
cigarettes are better able to recognize advertised products).
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